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Emotional Distress and the First
Amendment: An Analysis of Hustler v.
Falwell
Rodney A. Smolla*
Whether in florid impotence he speaks,
And, as the prompter breathes, the puppet squeaks;
Or at the ear of Eve, familiar Toad,
Half froth, half venom, spits himself abroad,
In puns, or politics, or tales, or lies,
Or spite, or smut, or rhymes, or blasphemies.
His wit all see-saw, between that and this,
Now high, now low. now master up, now miss,
And he himself one vile Antithesis.
Amphibious thing! that acting either part.
The trifling head or the corrupted heart,
Fop at the toilet, flatt'rer at the board,
Now trips a Lady, and now struts a Lord.
Eve's tempter thus the Robbins have exprest,
A Cherub's face, a reptile all the rest;
Beauty that shocks you, parts that none will trust;
Wit that can creep, and pride that licks the dust.

-Alexander Pope
Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court decided this term a case of profound first
amendment significance. 2 Television evangelist Reverend Jerry Falwell
was awarded $100,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive

• James Gould Cutler Professor of Constitutional Law, and Director, Institute of Bill of
Rights Law, College of William and Mary, Marshall Wythe School of Law. B.A. 1975, Yale;
J.D. 1978, Duke. Support for this research was provided in part by The Annenberg Washington
Program for Communications Policy Studies of Northwestern University. The views expressed
herein are solely those of the author. Some of the material contained in this article will appear,
in somewhat different form, in R. SMOLLA; JERRY FALWELL V. LARRY FLYNT (forthcoming 1988).
The author wishes to disclose that he participated in the preparation of an Amicus Curiae brief
filed in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Reverend Jerry Falwell, on behalf of Richmond Newspapers,
Inc., and several other media organizations, urging the Supreme Court to reverse the judgment
in favor of Reverend Falwell in Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986).
I. A. Pope, Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot, lines 317-333.
2. Hustler v. Falwell, _ _ U.S. _ _ , 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988), reviewing Falwell v. Flynt,
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damages against Hustler Magazine and its publisher, Larry Flynt, 3 in a
suit arising from a parody published by Hustler. This parody, in which
Falwell is depicted as having had sex with his mother, was not defamatory, was not an invasion of privacy, and was not legally obscene.
The Fourth Circuit held, however, that it satisfied all elements of the
tort of "intentional infliction of emotional distress," and because the
record clearly showed that Flynt intended to inflict distress on Falwell,
the award of damages did not offend the first amendment. 4 In effect,
Hustler Magazine and Larry Flynt were fined $200,000 for telling a
bad, dirty joke.
Many lawyers, journalists, and members of the general public may
initially react to this litigation with bemused disinterest. What does
Hustler's coarse parody have to do with the first amendment anyway?
If Hustler and Flynt lose, so what-they have it coming. We need to
put these smut peddlers out of business, 5 and if the law of obscenity
won't do it, 6 the tort system will.
Many Americans may be equally ambivalent toward Falwell's fortunes. They may, rightly or wrongly, perceive Falwell as a species of
hustler in his own right, part of a constellation of religion-pushers from
Oral Roberts to Jim and Tammy Bakker, 7 who deserve a little gratuitous
emotional distress once in a while to knock them off their hypocritical
high horses. When presented with Hustler's protestations of the lawsuit's
chilling effect on free speech and Falwell's claims of Hustler's chilling
effect on all things decent and pure in American life, the reflexive
reaction of many Americans may be to quote the recent quip of Chief
Justice Rehnquist: "A chill on both your houses! " 8

797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986), reh'g denied, 805 F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1986), rev'd, _ _ u.s.
_ _ 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988).
3. The jury awarded $100,000 in actual damages, and $50,000 in punitive damages against
Flynt, and $50,000 in punitive damages against Hustler. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1273
(4th Cir. 1986), reh'g denied, 805 F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1986), rev'd, _ _ U.S. _ _ , 108 S. Ct.
876 (1988).
4. /d. at 1275-77.
5. See, e.g., A. DwoRKIN, INTERCOURSE 48 (1987) (discussing "Hustler's meat-grinder cover,
in which a woman is fed into a meat grinder and comes out as ground beef"); MacKinnon,
Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1985). See also REPORT
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY (1986) (the "Meese Commission
Report").
6. See, e.g., American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd,
__u.s. __ , 106 s. ct. 1112 (1986).
7. See Smolla, Book Review, The First Liberty: Religion and the American Republic, and
Religion in American Public Life, 4 CoNsT. CoMM. 204, 205 n.4, 208 (1987) (citing Gordon,
Video Vicars: How They Tune Out the Press, WASH. JoURNALISM REv., Apr. 1986, at 39-47).
8. Justice Rehnquist made the quip from the bench during oral argument in Anderson v.
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One who resists this temptation to dismiss Hustler v. Falwell cavalierly, and grants the litigation the sober second thought it deserves,
sees a first amendment conflict of enormous difficulty and significance.
For however down and dirty Hustler,s parody was, the essence of the
satire was not that "Falwell had sex with his mother and therefore is
bad," but rather that "Falwell is a hypocrite and we don't like him. " 9
Seen in those terms the emotive and cognitive message of the ad was
a spirited and vicious premeditated attack against one of the most
prominent American public figures of our time. 10 The novel constitutional question posed by the case is whether the existence of intent to
cause emotional distress through the use of speech concerning a public
figure is sufficient to overcome first amendment protection of that
speech when the only risk posed by the speech is its capacity to inflict
severe emotional distress on that public figure.
The Supreme Court, in a striking display of unanimity, held that the
ad parody at issue in the Falwell litigation must be deemed absolutely
protected under the first amendment, and that no amount of fault on
the part of Hustler or Flynt should permit that protection to be pierced.
This article is a defense and an analysis of the Hustler decision. It is
argued that the result in the case was required, at the very least, on
the relatively narrow ground that the parody must be considered "opinion,'' and opinion is absolutely immune from liability regardless of
how outrageous, indecorous, or mean-spirited, and regardless of what
name is given to the legal cause of action under which it is prosecuted. 11
Most fundamentally, however, absolute protection for the parody was
compelled by a far more sweeping proposition: when speech concerns
public figures and public issues, the capacity of the speech to cause
emotional disturbance is never enough, standing alone, to justify its
abridgementY The proposition goes to the heart of the first amendment-Justice Holmes's haunting admonition that "[e]very idea is an

Liberty Lobby, Inc., _ _ u.s. __ , 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). See 12 Med. L. Rev. (BNA) 1344
(News Notes, Dec. 10, 1985).
9. As subsequently discussed, no reasonable person could have misconstrued the ad parody
as purporting to actually make the factual assertion that Falwell had sex with his mother. See
infra text accompanying notes 25-26. The jury explicitly found that the ad could not be so
interpreted. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1273 (4th Cir.), reh'g denied, 805 F.2d 484 (4th Cir.
1986), rev'd, _ _ u.s. __ , 108 s. Ct. 876 (1988).
10. On Reverend Falwell's extraordinary religious and political influence as a contemporary
American public figure, see, e.g., A. REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PuBLIC LIFE 315-17 (1985);
God and Money, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 6, 1987, at 16-22.
11. See infra notes 137-57 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 82-97 and accompanying text.
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incitement." 13 It is a proposition not garnered merely from the band
of cases emanating from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 14 but rather

13. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
14. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In New York Times, the Court held that in a libel suit brought by
a public official, the first amendment requires the plaintiff to demonstrate with clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant published the statement with "actual malice," that is, "with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." I d. at 279-80, 28586. The literature on the Times case is rich. See, e.g., Berney, Libel and the First AmendmentA New Constitutional Privilege, 51 VA. L. REv. I (1965); Bertelsman, The First Amendment and
Protection of Reputation and Privacy-New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and How it Grew, 56
KY. L.J. 718 (1967); Bertelsman, Libel and Public Men, 52 A.B.A. J. 657 (1966); Brennan, The
Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARv. L. REv. I
(1965); Carter, Right of Reply Versus the Sullivan Rule: Time for a Second Look, 27 LoY. L.
REv. 41 (1981); Green, The New York Times Rule: Judicial Overkill, 12 Vu.L. L. REv. 730 (1967);
Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment",
1964 SUP. CT. REv. 191; LeBel, Reforming the Tort of Defamation: An Accommodation of
Competing Interests Within the Current Constitutional Framework, 66 NEB. L. REV. 249 (1987);
Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Times to Return to "The Central Meaning of
the First Amendment," 83 CoLUM. L. REv. 603 (1983); Merin, Libel and the Supreme Court, II
WM. & MARY L. REv. 371 (1969); Nelson, Newsmen and the Times Doctrine, 12 Vu.. L. REv.
738 (1967); Ottley, Lewis & Ottley, New York Times v. Sullivan: A Retrospective Examination,
33 DEPAUL L. REv. 741 (1984); Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel: The Modern
Revised Translation, 49 CoRN. L.Q. 581 (1964); Pierce, The Anatomy of an Historic Decision,
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 43 N.C.L. REv. 315 (1965). See also R. SMOLLA, SUING THE
PRESS: LIBEL, THE MEDIA, AND POWER 26-52 (1986).
Throughout this article the Times case and its progeny will be referred to frequently in passing.
The Supreme Court first extended the actual malice standard beyond public officials, to include
"public figures," in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), and Associated Press
v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). In a plurality opinion, the Court briefly flirted with extending
the actual malice standard to any defamatory statement involving an issue of public interest,
without regard to the public or private status of the plaintiff. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,
403 U.S. 29 (1971). In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Court rejected the
Rosenbloom approach, dividing the law of defamation between public and private plaintiffs.
Public officials and public figures were required to meet the actual malice standard. States were
free to establish their own standards for private figure plaintiffs, as long as they did not establish
liability without fault. Gertz prohibited any award of punitive or presumed damages unless actual
malice was established. In private figure cases tried under the negligence standard, Gertz further
required that actual injury be demonstrated, though a broad range of injuries remained compensable and proof requirements were not rigorous. For commentary on Gertz, see, e.g., R. SACK,
LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS §§ 1.2.5, V.3 (1980); Anderson, Libel and Press SelfCensorship, 53 TEx. L. REV. 422 (1975); Anderson, A Response to Professor Robertson: The
Issue is Control of Press Power, 54 TEx. L. REv. 271 (1976); Ashdown, Gertz and Firestone: A
Study in Constitutional Policy-Making, 61 MINN. L. REV. 645 (1977); Christie, Injuries to
Reputation and the Constitution: Confusion Amid Conflicting Approaches, 75 MICH. L. REv. 43
(1976); Christie, Underlying Contradictions in the Supreme Court's Classification of Defamation,
1981 DUKE L.J. 811; Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REv. 1349 (1975); Frakt, Defamation Since
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.: The Emerging Common Law, 10 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 519 (1979); LaRue,
Living with Gertz: A Practical Look at Constitutional Libel Standards, 67 VA. L. REv. 287
(1981); Rosen, Media Lament-The Rise and Fall of Involuntary Public Figures, 54 ST. JoHN's
L. REv. 487 (1980); Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v.
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from the wide expanse of first amendment cases encompassing incitement to violence, fighting words, commercial speech, symbolic speech,
and obscenity. 15 To justify penalizing speech on matters of public
concern, the government must meet a heavy burden of demonstrating
that the abridgement is required to prevent some palpable species of
social harm; the emotional disturbance generated by the content of the
speech will never by itself be sufficient to provide that justification.
Because Falwell's suit is simply a public figure striking back for
intense distress suffered in the rough and tumble of the American
ideological marketplace, it was, in the end, easy pickings for demolition
under the first amendment. 16 Suits for emotional distress in many other
contexts, however, are not so easily dismissedY In announcing its
holding in Hustler, the Court was quite careful to limit. the decision to
public officials and public figures. 18 The intellectual challenge posed by
Falwell's suit is not how to construct a convincing rationale for rejecting
his claim, but rather how to articulate limits on that rationale that will
permit suits for emotional distress inflicted through speech in other
contexts to survive. This challenge must be faced and resolved, for one
can easily conjure up examples of emotional distress inflicted solely
because of the content of speech in which something less than absolute
first amendment protection is clearly warranted. This matter cannot be
resolved merely by superimposing the defamation fault rules of New
York Times and Gertz v. Robert Welch. Inc. 19 upon the cause of action
for infliction of emotional distress. After discussing the powerful first
amendment concerns implicated in any imposition of tort liability for
speech that inflicts emotional distress, ·this article presents a solution
involving multi-tiered levels of fault. These tiers range from absolute
immunity, to actual malice, to negligence, and are geared to reflect the
unique balance of interests at stake in the emotional distress context. 20

Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEx. L. REv. 199 (1976); Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation
of the American Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REv. I (1983); Watkins & Schwartz, Gertz and the
Common Law of Defamation: Of Fault, NonMedia Defendants, and Conditional Privileges, 15
TEX. TECH L. REV. 823 (1984).
In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985), the Court held
that the first amendment restrictions on presumed and punitive damages in Gertz did not apply
in a private figure case in which the speech did not involve matters of public concern.
15. See infra notes 87-125 and accompanying text.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 178-90.
17. See infra notes 178-90, 212-19, and accompanying text.
18. See _ _ u.s. at _ _ , 108 S. Ct. at 882.
19. See supra note 14.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 219-24.
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AMERICAN CLASSIC

The Parody

Lest one cheat Reverend Jerry Falwell of the full passion of his
lawsuit, and fight only the abstract strawmen of the conceptual elements
of his cause of action, it is fairest to examine the facts of his case in
unsanitized, graphic detail. An advertising campaign for Campari Liqueur several years ago featured celebrities such as Jill St. John talking
about their "first time." The interviews in the ad ostensibly concerned
the celebrities' first encounter with Campari, but the racy double
entendre was sexual. The catch-line of the advertising campaign was:
"Campari. You'll never forget your first time." Hustler Magazine, in
its November 1983 issue, ran a full-page mock Campari Liqueur ad
entitled "Jerry Falwell talks about his first time." The parody included
a picture of Falwell, a picture of a bottle of Campari with a glass of
Campari on the rocks, and a fictional interview with Falwell. The
''interview'' was, by any standard, rough business:
FALWELL: My first time was in an outhouse outside Lynchburg,
Virginia.
INTERVIEWER: Wasn't it a little cramped?
FALWELL: Not after I kicked the goat out.
INTERVIEWER: I see. You must tell me all about it.
FALWELL: I never really expected to make it with Morn, but then
after she showed all the other guys in town such a good time, I
figured, "What the hell!"
INTERVIEWER: But your morn? Isn't that a bit odd?
FALWELL: I don't think so. Looks don't mean that much to me
in a woman.
INTERVIEWER: Go on.
FALWELL: Well, we were drunk off our God-fearing asses on
Carnpari, ginger ale and soda-that's called a Fire and Brimstone
-at the time. And Morn looked better than a Baptist whore with
a $100 donation.
INTERVIEWER: Carnpari in the crapper with Mom . . . how
interesting. Well, how was it?
FALWELL: The Carnpari was great, but Mom passed out before
I could come.
INTERVIEWER: Did you ever try it again?
FALWELL: Sure . . . lots of times. But not in the outhouse.
Between Morn and the shit, the flies were too much to bear.
INTERVIEWER: We meant the Carnpari.
FALWELL: Oh, yeah. I always get sloshed before I go out to the
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pulpit. You don't think I could lay down all that bullshit sober, do
you?21

The ad was listed in the table of contents (yes, Hustler has a table
of contents) as "Fiction; Ad and Personality Parody." 22 At the bottom
of the page on which the ad appears it stated: "Ad Parody-Not to
be Taken Seriously.' '23
Falwell took it seriously, however, and filed suit in federal court in
Virginia. Not one to back away from a good fight, Larry Flynt promptly
republished the parody in Hustler's issue of March 1984. 24
Falwell sued under three theories: defamation, appropriation of name
or likeness, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Falwell lost
on his defamation claim, because the jury correctly concluded that no
reasonable person would believe that Hustler intended the ad parody
to describe actual facts about Falwell. 2s The parody was so outrageous
that it could not possibly be mistaken for a real ad, or be understood
to convey the factual message that Falwell had actually had sex with
his mother in an outhouse. Falwell also lost on his appropriation claim,
because to be prohibited under Virginia law, such an appropriation
must be for purposes of trade or advertising. 26 Because the parody was
a fake advertisement, the court ruled that the use of Falwell's name
and photograph did not fall within the meaning of the statute. 27 Falwell
prevailed, however, on his claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and that victory, in its first embarrassing blush, seemed unassailable.

21. HusTLER MAGAZINE, Nov. 1983, plaintiff's Exhibit l, Joint Appendix p. 1500 (copy on
file with Arizona State Law Journal).
22. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1272 (4th Cir. 1986), reh'g denied, 805 F.2d 484 (4th
Cir. 1986), cert. granted, _ _ U.S. _ _ , 107 S. Ct. 1601 (1987).
23. /d.
24. /d. at _ _ , 107 S. Ct. at 1273.
25. /d.
26. VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 5.01-.40 (1985). The Fourth Circuit noted that the Virginia appropriation of name or likeness statute was patterned after the New York model. 797 F.2d at 1278.
Under section 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law, N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney
1976), the use of a celebrity's name or likeness in connection with a news story or editorial
comment does not constitute appropriation for purposes of trade. See, e.g., Namath v. Sports
Illustrated, 48 A.D.2d 487, 371 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1975), aff'd, 39 N.Y.2d 897, 352 N.E.2d 584, 386
N.Y.S.2d 397 (1976); Booth v. Curtis Publishing Co., 15 A.D.2d 343, 349, 223 N.Y.S.2d 737,
743, afj'd, ll N.Y.2d 907, 182 N.E.2d 812, 208 N.Y.S.2d 468 (1962); Gautier v. Pro-Football,
Inc., 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952); Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 189 A.D.
467, 178 N.Y.S. 752 (1919); B. SANFORD, LmEL AND PRTVACY: THE PREVENTION AND DEFENSE OF
LmGATION § 11.5.1, at 473-74. But see Cher v. Forum Int'l, Ltd., 692 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1120 (1983) (advertising in connection with interview of Cher created false
impression of endorsement and could be actionable as a commercial appropriation).
27. See Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1278. See also supra discussion in note 26.
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The Seductive Logic of the Court of Appeals

The Fourth Circuit began its analysis in Falwell with what appeared
to be enlightened sensitivity to first amendment values. The court flatly
accepted the proposition that the defendants were "entitled to the same
level of protection in an action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress that they would receive in an action for libel. " 28 The court
realized that although defamation was once the primary vehicle by
which those injured by speech obtained recompense, invasion of privacy
torts and actions for infliction of emotional distress are now commonly
pleaded as companions to defamation in lawsuits arising from tortious
publication. 29 A plaintiff may not avoid the constitutional rules established in New York Times Co. v. Sul/ivan 30 and its progeny, 31 the court
reasoned, by artfully pleading alternate tort theories. "It is not the
theory of liability advanced but the status of the plaintiff, as a public
figure or official and the gravamen of a tortious publication which give
rise to the first amendment protection prescribed by New York Times. " 32
This solid start was followed by an equally solid insight-that to
state that the defendants should receive the same quantum of protection
required by New York Times does not mean that the court should
apply the actual malice standard of the Times case-knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard for the truth-in the emotional distress
context. 33 The Times standard focuses on knowing or reckless falsity.
The emotional distress tort, by contrast, has nothing to do with truth
or falsity. 34
To satisfy the elements of infliction of emotional distress in Virginia,
the wrongdoer's conduct: 1) must be intentional or reckless; (2) must
offend generally accepted standards of decency or morality; (3) must
be causally connected with the plaintiff's emotional distress; and (4)
must cause severe emotional distress. 35 New York Times, the court
argued, did not change any of the elements of the tort of defamation,
but rather raised the required level of fault to actual malice. 36 Thus,
Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1274.
/d. See generally R. SMOLLA, LAw OF DEFAMATION § 10.01 (1986); Entin, Privacy,
Emotional Distress, and the Limits of Libel Reform, 38 MERCER L. REv. 835 (1987); Mead, Suing
the Media for Emotional Distress: A Multi-Method Analysis of Tort Law Evolution, 23 WASHBURN
L.J. 24 (1983).
28.
29.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

376

u.s.

254 (1964).

See supra note 14.
Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1274.
/d.

!d. at 1275-76.
/d. at 1275 n.4 (citing Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (1974)).
/d. at 1275.
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the Times decision left the essential nature of the tort of defamation
unchanged. 37
So too, the court reasoned, the first amendment should not alter the
elements of the emotional distress tort, but rather should require a
minimum threshold of fault equivalent to that required in the defamation context. 38 The cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress under Virginia law contains a requirement of intentional or reckless misconduct. Thus, the court reasoned, the cause of
action has "built-in" a level of fault equivalent to that required in the
defamation context by New York Times. 39 The court held that the
record supported the conclusion that Flynt, in publishing the ad parody,
acted intentionally or recklessly to inflict emotional distress upon Reverend Falwell. 40
The first time through, to spot any glaring flaw in this analysis is
difficult. Certainly, the court's treatment of the facts was convincing.
No one, of course, can plumb the surreal depths of Larry Flynt's mind
with absolute confidence, but the record seems amply to support the
finding of intentional conduct. Consider, for example, the following
colloquy between Falwell's lawyer and Flynt:
Q. Did you want to upset Reverend Falwell?
A. Yes . . . .
Q. Do you recognize that in having published what you did in
this ad, you were attempting to convey to the people who read it
that Reverend Falwell was just as you characterized him, a liar?
A. He's a glutton.
Q. How about a liar?
A. Yeah. He's a liar, too.
Q. How about a hypocrite?
A. Yeah.
Q. That's what you wanted to convey?
A. Yeah.
Q. And didn't it occur to you that if it wasn't true, you were
attacking a man in his profession?
A. Yes.

37. /d. The California Supreme Court recently challenged the Fourth Circuit on this point.
See Blatty v. New York Times Co., 42 Cal. 3d 1033, _ _ , 728 P.2d 1177, 1186, 232 Cal. Rptr.
542, 551 (1986) ("Indeed, in . . . (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan] the Court effectively held
that the [f}irst [a)mendment abrogated the common law of strict liability, added the element of
falsity, and thereby altered the nature of the tort. The Falwell court misses this crucial point and
as a result cannot be followed.").
38. Falwell, 797 F .2d at 1274.
39. /d.
40. !d. at 1276-77.
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Q. Did you appreciate, at the time that you wrote "okay" or
approved this publication, that for Reverend Falwell to function in
his livelihood, and in his commitment and career, he has to have
an integrity that people believe in?
A. Yeah.
Q. And wasn't one of your objectives to destroy that integrity, or
harm it, if you could?
A. To assassinate it. 41

One can fairly infer from this dialogue that Larry Flynt hates Jerry
Falwell's guts, and set out to do whatever he could to hurt him. 42
The record also supports Falwell's claim of severe distress. Testifying
about his reaction to the ad, Falwell stated:
A. I think I have never been as angry as I was at that moment.
. . . My anger became a more rational and deep hurt. I somehow
felt that in all of my life I had never believed that human beings
could do something like this. I really felt like weeping. I am not a
deeply emotional person; I don't show it. I think I felt like weeping.
Q. How long did this sense of anger last?
A. To this present moment.
Q. You say that it almost brought you to tears. In your whole
life, Mr. Falwell, had you every had a personal experience of such
intensity that could compare with the feeling that you had when
you saw this ad?
A. Never had. Since I have been a Christian, I don't think I have
ever intentionally hurt anybody. I am sure I have hurt people but
not with intent. I certainly have never physically attacked anyone
in my life. I really think that at that moment if Larry Flynt had
been nearby I might have physically reactedY

This testimony is intriguing. The intensity of Falwell's distress is convincing, but it does not appear to be caused so much by what the ad
said as such, but rather by Falwell's dismay that so much evil could

41. Deposition testimony of Larry Flynt, admitted into evidence at trial, Joint Appendix at
901-02. See 797 F.2d at 1273.
42. Larry Flynt was in a state of severe psychological disturbance at the time the deposition
was taken, and his lawyers argued vigorously, but ultimately without success, that the videotape
of the deposition should not have been admitted at trial. /d. at 1277. When asked to identify
himself for the deposition, for example, Flynt called himself "Christopher Columbus Cornwallis
l.P.Q. Harvey H. Apache Pugh." /d. at 1273. He testified that the ad parody was actually
written by Yoko Ono and Billy Idol. /d. Whatever Flynt's mental state at the time of his
deposition, however, the basic proposition that he cannot stand Falwell and that Hustler set out
intentionally to cause him distress rings true from the record, if not from the text of the ad
parody itself.
43. Id. at 1276.
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exist in the world. Falwell met the devil face to face for the first time,
and felt so badly about the encounter he sued him. Whatever one
thinks of this testimony, however, it was certainly ample record evidence
to affirm the jury award, if the legal analysis of the Fourth Circuit is
sound.
Ill.

THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit in an 8-0 ruling. 44
Chief Justice Rehnquist began his opinion for the Court by reviewing
the history of the case, including the jury's verdict and the decision of
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirming the $200,000 jury award.
He then summarized the issues facing the Supreme Court. "This case,"
wrote Rehnquist, "presents us with a novel question involving [f]irst
[a]mendment limitations upon a States's authority to protect its citizens
from the intentional infliction of emotional distress. " 45 Rehnquist described the Campari ad parody as offensive to Jerry Falwell, and
"doubtless gross and repugnant in the eyes of most. " 46
Rehnquist began his analysis with an essay on the purposes of the
first amendment. "At the heart of the [f]irst [a]mendment," he wrote,
"is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of
ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern.' ' 47 He
then recognized the two principal functions of free speech, the selffulfillment of the individual speaker, and the broader social search for
enlightenment. Quoting from the Court's 1984 decision, Bose v. Consumers Union, 48 he noted that "'the freedom to speak one's mind is
not only an aspect of individual liberty-and thus a good unto itselfbut also is essential to the common quest for truth and the vitality of
society as a whole."' 49 The Court has been particularly vigilant, he
observed, to ensure that ideas remain free from governmentally imposed
sanctions, because the "[f]irst [a)mendment recognizes no such thing
as a 'false' idea." 50 Rehnquist capped off his introductory remarks by
invoking one of the most sacred passages in the first amendment
tradition, the haunting appeal for tolerance by Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes in his dissent in Abrams v. United States: "'[W]hen men have

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Hustler v. Falwell, _ _ U.S. _ _ , 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988).
Id. at _ _ , 108 S. Ct. at 879.
/d.
/d.

Bose Corp. v. Consumer's Union of United States, Jnc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
_ _ U.S. a t - - · 108 S. Ct. at 879 (quoting Bose, 466 U.S. at 503-04).
/d. (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974)).
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realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to
believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by a free trade
in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market." ' 51
Chief Justice Rehnquist hadestablished his philosophical base. This
opinion was decidedly not grounded in the thesis that society must
regulate public discourse to elevate it. 52 Rehnquist had instead begun
with a ringing endorsement of the classic Holmes/Brandeis view of free
speech. 53 Rehnquist was endorsing the marketplace of ideas metaphor,
not grudgingly, but with positive enthusiasm.
If the marketplace of ideas was to be robust and wide-open, what
did that bode for public figures? The next section of Rehnquist's
analysis went to great lengths to establish that in America the prevailing
ethos is not to encourage people to enter the public arena by guaranteeing them shelter from caustic and virulent attack; it is rather to
require as a cost of entering the public arena a certain toughening of
the hide. Good but sensitive people may be discouraged in America
from stepping forward into public life, but that is part of the price of
an open society and a spirited democracy. In this nation, a public
figure must be able to take as well as give.
Public figures, observed Chief Justice Rehnquist, have a substantial
capacity to shape events. Quoting Felix Frankfurter, he noted that one
'"of the prerogatives of American citizenship is the right to criticize
public men and measures." ' 54 And in this country, such criticism will
not always be reasoned and moderate. Quoting from Monitor Patriot
Co. v. Roy, 55 Rehnquist made a point that seemed aimed personally at
Jerry Falwell: "'[T]he candidate who vaunts his spotless record and
sterling integrity cannot convincingly cry 'Foul!' when an opponent or
an industrious reporter attempts to demonstrate the contrary."' 56 This
quote was a diplomatic way of stating to Reverend Falwell that moralists
must expect attacks on their morality.
This does not mean, cautioned Rehnquist, ''that any speech about a
public figure is immune from sanction in the form of damages. " 57

51. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
52. See A. BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND (1987).
53. See generally H. KALVEN, A WoRTHY TRADITION 125-78 (1988).
54. _ _ U.S. at _ _ , 108 S. Ct. at 879-80 (quoting Baumgartner v. United States, 322
u.s. 665, 673-74 (1944)).
55 .. 401 u.s. 265 (1971).
56. _ _ U.S. a t - - · 108 S. Ct. at 880, (quoting Monitor Patriot, 401 U.S. at 274).
57. Jd. (Emphasis in original).
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Speech that is libelous in the conventional sense-speech that contains
genuine misstatements of fact and that injures reputation-may be
penalized in some circumstances. But even here, Rehnquist admonished,
the Constitution requires that the rules of libel be fashioned to provide
sufficient breathing space for free speech. In what was, to most observers, a remarkable paragraph, Chief Justice Rehnquist proceeded to
wholeheartedly endorse New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and its progeny. For public figures and public officials, it was critical that they
prove that the offending statement was both false and made with actual
malice. 58 If the Chief Justice had any doubts about the wisdom of the
New York Times 59 ruling, they were not apparent here; in both letter
and spirit, he was reaffirming New York Times with relish.
The argument of the Fourth Circuit, however, was that the rules
emanating from New York Times did not apply to the emotional distress
tort, and that the state's interest in protecting its citizens from emotional
distress far outweighed any interest the speaker may have in propagating
vulgar and shocking speech. It should adequately protect first amendment interests, they argued, to require that the plaintiff prove intent
to inflict the distress and to prove that the speech is offensive and
outrageous.
But in the world of debate over public affairs, Rehnquist pointed
out, many things are done with motives that are less than admirable,
and they do not for that reason alone forfeit first amendment protection. That an utterance is spoken out of hatred does not mean it is
false. Larry Flynt may hate Jerry Falwell as much as Jerry Falwell
hates Satan, but it does not follow that the hate-filled speech of either
man is not in its own way a contribution to the free interchange of
ideas. Rehnquist thus wrote that "while such a bad motive may be
deemed controlling for purposes of tort liability in other areas of the
law, we think the [f]irst [a]mendment prohibits such a result in the
area of public debate about public figures. " 60
This conclusion, the Chief Justice argued, was necessary to avoid
censoring the work of political cartoonists and satirists. The art of
caricature, he argued, is based on deliberate distortion or exaggeration

58. !d.
59. One of the most striking things about the Hustler decision is that Chief Justice Rehnquist
repeatedly quoted and cited with approval many of the decisions emanating from New York
Times in which he had previously been a dissenter. Prior to Hustler, this author and many others
had voiced the suspicion that the Chief Justice and other members of the Court were tempted to
roll-back the progeny of New York Times. See Smolla, Dun & Bradstreet, Hepps, and Liberty
Lobby: A New Analytic Primer on the Future Course of Defamation, 75 GEo. L.J. 1519 (1987).
60. _ _ U.S. a t - - · 108 S. Ct. at 881.
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for satirical effect. The cartoonist's method is often not reasoned or
evenhanded, but slashing and one-sided, full of black scorn and ridicule.
Rehnquist then engaged in a moving tribute to the great American
tradition of spirited satire and parody of public figures. He described
the cartoons of Thomas Nast, who published in Harper's Weekly in
the post-Civil War era. Nast engaged in a graphic vendetta against
William M. "Boss" Tweed and his corrupt "Tweed Ring" in New
York City. Nast was effective because he constantly went beyond the
bounds of good manners and taste. Rehnquist recalled caricatures of
George Washington, James G. Blaine, and Abraham Lincoln, and
cartoonists' renditions of "Teddy Roosevelt's glasses and teeth, and
Franklin D. Roosevelt's jutting jaw and cigarette holder. " 61 From the
viewpoint of history, he argued, "it is clear that our political discourse
would have been considerably poorer without them. " 62
But could not these famous caricatures in political cartoons be
distinguished from the coarse Hustler parody? Rehnquist conceded that
the Hustler parody was at best a distant cousin of the conventional
political cartoon, "and a rather poor relation at that. " 63 In what may
have been the single most important analytic step in his opinion,
however, Rehnquist argued that there was simply no way to draw a
principled distinction between the Hustler parody and other satiric
efforts. The statement "I know it when I see it" 64 is simply not good
enough. "If it were possible," stated Rehnquist, "by laying down a
principled standard to separate the one from the other, public discourse
would probably suffer little or no harm. " 65 But the Supreme Court was
doubtful, Rehnquist explained, that any reasonably concrete standard
could ever be articulated. One thing was certainly clear: the amorphous
pejorative "outrageous" was too subjective to withstand first amendment requirements. To permit a jury to impose liability for mere
"outrageousness" would invite jurors to base liability on the basis of
their tastes and prejudices. 66

61. /d.
62. /d.
63. /d.
64. The statement is Justice Potter Stewart's, describing obscenity in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378
U.S. 184 (1964). Stewart wrote that he could never succeed in intelligibly defining obscenity,
"[b]ut I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that." /d. at
197 (Stewart, J., concurring). This pithy statement became part of American legal folklore. Pith,
however, is no substitute for analysis, and the Supreme Court in Hustler was unwilling to follow
Justice Stewart's lead.
65. _ _ U.S. at _ _ , 108 S. Ct. at 881.
66. /d. at _ _ , 108 S. Ct. at 882.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist then made it clear that the mere capacity of
speech to embarrass or offend did not strip it of its protected character.
In citing the holdings in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 67 the George
Carlin "seven-dirty-words" case, and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 68
the "fighting words" case, Rehnquist emphasized that those holdings
represented narrow exceptions to the general first amendment rule that
the government must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas. While
the Court had recognized that all speech is not of equal first amendment
importance, Rehnquist explained, the speech in this case simply did not
fit into the precisely drawn categories in which lower levels of protection
had been permitted. 69 "We conclude," wrote Rehnquist, "that public
figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress by reason of publications such as the
one here at issue without showing in addition that the publication
contains a false statement of fact which was made with 'actual malice,'
i.e., with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless
disregard as to whether it was true. " 70 Here, the jury had explicitly
found that the statement was not factual. In the absence of a misstatement of fact, Falwell could not, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained,
recover for the mere intentional infliction of emotional distress. Only
Justice Byron White failed to join the Rehnquist opinion, instead filing
a brief, two-sentence, separate concurring opinion. "As I see it, the
decision in New York Times v. Sullivan, has little to do with this case,
for here the jury found that the ad contained no assertion of fact, " 71
wrote Justice White. "But I agree with the Court that the judgment
below, which penalized the publication of the parody, cannot be squared
with the [f]irst [a]mendment. " 72
IV.

A

FIRST AMENDMENT CRITIQUE

A.

Relational Risks

The key sentence in Hustler v. Falwell comes in its penultimate
paragraph, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist succinctly restates the

67.
68.
69.
panying
70.
71.
72.
case.

438 u.s. 726 (1978).
315 u.s. 568 (1941).
For a discussion of the implications of this passage, see infra notes 152-97 and accomtext.
_ _ U.S. at _ _ , 108 S. Ct. at 882.
ld. at _ _ , 108 S. Ct. at 883 (White, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
Id. Justice Anthony Kennedy took no part in the consideration on the decision of the
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holdings of the Court: "We conclude that public figures and public
officials may not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress by reason of publications such as the one here at
issue without showing in addition that the publication contains a false
statement of fact which was made with 'actual malice,' i.e., with
knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to
whether or not it was true. " 73 Given the abiding suspicion in many
quarters that the Chief Justice simply could not have written a resounding press victory, this sentence will inevitably be subjected to microscopic examination, in a search for loopholes. Beyond the one reservation
it explicitly articulates-that it is limited to public officials and public
figures-! am convinced there are none.
From his concurring opinion, one gathers that Justice White construes
this sentence as linking the emotional distress tort to the actual malice
standard of New York Times. 74 This, however, is a mistaken construction. The critical phrase in the sentence is not the recapitulation of the
actual malice test, but rather the words, "in addition that the publi-

cation contains a false statement of fact. " 75
Notwithstanding the momentum of tort law's increasing solicitude
for protection of emotional tranquility, 76 the decision in Hustler must
be construed to bar recovery absolutely when the plaintiff is a public
figure and the essence of the tort is not a factual misstatement, but
the mere infliction of distress. That this is the only permissible interpretation of the holding is clear against the backdrop of the Fourth
Circuit decision. As the Fourth Circuit recognized, to simply lift the
terms "intentional" or "reckless" out of the New York Times case
and pluck them into the elements of the emotional distress tort, assuming the meaning remains the same in both contexts, is not enough. 77
The court, however, dissipated its good instincts on this point and
lapsed into the very mechanical trap it sought to avoid. For the court
failed to perceive that moving from one tort context to another changes
not only the elements of the tort cause of action, but also the balance
of first amendment interests.
Terms describing levels of fault are not meaningful in the abstract.
The terms "intentional,'' "reckless,'' or "negligent" are always relational; they have meaning only when describing the relationship between

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

/d. at _ _ , 108 S. Ct. at 882.
!d. at _ _ , 108 S. Ct. at 883.
!d. at _ _ , 108 S. Ct. at 882 (emphasis added).
See R. SMOLLA, supra note 14, at 3-25.
Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1270.
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an actor's conduct and specific risks. Judge Cardozo, in his famous
explication of the terms "negligence" and "proximate cause" in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 78 emphasized that there is no such
thing as "negligence in the air, " 79 and that one cannot even think of
negligence except in relational terms. 80 The same is true for "intentional" or "reckless" conduct.
When the Supreme Court "constitutionalized" part of the law of
defamation in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 81 it established a
relational connection between the publisher's conduct and a specific
risk-the risk of publishing a defamatory false statement of fact. To
simply lift the New York Times formulation out of the context of
defamation and apply it literally to the tort of infliction of emotional
distress is logically indefensible, because the relationship between the
publisher's conduct and the risks encompassed by the emotional distress
tort differs in kind from the relationship between the conduct and risk
at stake in defamation. The term "actual malice," as used in New
York Times, is nonsensical when applied mechanically to the emotional
distress claim in Falwell. One cannot speak meaningfully about the
publisher's subjective doubt as to truth or falsity when neither the
initial decisionmaking process of the publisher nor the subsequent injury
to the plaintiff has anything to do with the truth or falsity of the
communication, or with its capacity to inflict reputational damage.
This is the point Justice White was emphasizing in his concurrence.
White's fears, however, were misplaced, for when viewed in its entire
context, it is clear that Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion does not
disagree with White's.
The terms "intentional" and "reckless" are meaningful in the Hustler
case only in relation to a very different risk-the risk that publishing
the parody would proximately cause severe emotional distress. It is
confusing to ask how the standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
should apply to this case. The Times standard was crafted for a different
relationship between an actor's conduct and risks of social harm. The
proper question to ask is: How should the first amendment be applied
to restrict a state's decision to impose penalties for this sort of conduct
in relation to this sort of risk? When conceived in those terms, the

78. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
79. !d. at - - • 162 N.E. at 99 (quoting B. PoLLACK, TORTS 455 (II ed.)).
80. "Negligence," wrote Cardozo, "is thus a term of relation. Negligence in the abstract,
apart from things related, is surely not a tort, if indeed it is understandable at all." /d. at 345,
162 N.E. ai 101 (citing Thomas v. Quartermaine, 18 Q.B.D. 685, 694 (1887)).
81. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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first amendment issue posed is both profound and stark: May a public
figure recover compensatory and punitive damages in a tort suit when
a publisher acts intentionally or recklessly only in relation to the risk
that his publication will inflict severe emotional distress? Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion answers emphatically: "No."

B. The Palpable Harm Requirement
Despite the fact that the New York Times standard cannot be
mechanically plugged into the emotional distress tort, the Times holding
is not irrelevant. Rather, Times remains useful as part of the broader
universe of first amendment cases that provide guidance concerning the
relative weights of the competing interests posed in the emotional
distress context. New York Times and its progeny, as well as first
amendment cases in many other contexts, reveal this cardinal principle:
the power of speech to generate severe emotional disturbance on issues
of public concern is never enough, standing alone, to justify abridging
that speech, even when the infliction of emotional disturbance is intentional. 82 The government may curtail speech only when it produces
some other, more palpable, species of social harm that the government
may prevent. 83
The very purpose of effective speech is to "disturb," often on both
cognitive and emotional levels. In Gitlow v. New York, 84 Justice Holmes
said that "whatever may be thought of the redundant discourse before
us it had no chance of starting a present conflagration. " 85 The same is
true of the "discourse" in Falwell. The ad parody simply had no
capacity to cause any harm other than the infliction of emotional
distress. As Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion explained, permitting
Jerry Falwell to recover would run "afoul of our longstanding refusal
to allow damages to be awarded because the speech in question may
have an adverse emotional impact on the audience. " 86
82.

As the Supreme Court explained in Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. I, 4 (1949):
[A) function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute.
It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest,
creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.
Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea.
That is why freedom of speech . . . is nevertheless protected against censorship or
punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious
substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.
83. See NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982) ("Speech does not
lose its protected character, however, simply because it may embarass others . . . . ").
84. 268 u.s. 652 (1925}.
85. /d. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
86. Hustler, _ _u.s. at - - · 108 s. Ct. at 882.
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The first amendment thus permits curtailing speech that infringes a
protected common law property right in one's name or likeness, 87 or
that interferes with protected copyright interests, 88 or that interferes
with the orderly administration of the selective service system. 89 In each
of these situations the content of the speech is not being regulated
because of its intellectual or emotional impact as such, but because the
speech interferes with a legitimate social interest other than disagreement
with or disquiet from the content of the speech. 90
Similarly, defamation and false-light invasion of privacy actions
concern more than the protection of emotional tranquility; they also
serve the state interests in deterring the publication of damaging false
information and protecting reputation. 91 Because there is "no constitutional value in false statements of fact," 92 a state may provide
remedies for injuries arising from such false statements. 93 When no
false statements of fact are involved, however, the Supreme Court has
struck a sharply different first amendment balance. 94 So too, states may
legitimately ban obscene publications, after meeting the relatively rigorous definitional requirements of obscenity, because the Court has
declared obscene material to be utterly devoid of first amendment
value. 95 In the special first amendment context of broadcast regulation,
with unique social interests at stake, the government possesses a narrow
power to regulate vulgar speech that does not rise to the level of the
legally obscene. 96 In none of these contexts, however, has the Supreme

87. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
88. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
89. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
90. Even when claims of copyright or the right of publicity are involved, the first amendment
requires that parody or satire be given wide compass. See Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v.
Day and Night Co., 689 F.2d 317, 319 n.2 (2d Cir. 1982); Elsmere Music, Inc., v. National
Broadcasting Co., 623 F.2d 252, 253 n.1 (2d Cir. 1980).
91. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 777 (1984).
92. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
93. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976). Because the Supreme Court permitted
recovery in the Firestone case for emotional distress, without requiring proof of reputational
injury, the case is obviously extremely important in analyzing Reverend Falwell's suit. The case
is discussed later in this article with regard to limits on first amendment protections in situations
not involving both public figures and public speech. See infra text accompanying notes 217-19.
94. In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), the father of a deceased rape
victim was denied recovery for the emotional injuries allegedly caused by the publication of his
daughter's name in violation of a Georgia statute prohibiting such disclosure. In addition to
holding that the father's action was barred, the Court recognized that, at least where public
figures or public officials are concerned, falsity is a constitutionally required predicate to recovery
for injury to reputation or psyche. /d. at 489-90.
95. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
96. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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Court permitted speech to be abridged solely because of its emotional
impact. 97 The Hustler decision is a momentous reaffirmation of that
principle.
C.

Incitement, Fighting Words, and Symbolic Speech

No one can deny the intense emotional distress that may be generated
by the spectacle of members of the American Nazi Party marching in
uniformed lock-step through a Jewish community, or by hooded members of the Ku Klux Klan burning crosses, and shouting vicious slurs
against Blacks, Jews, and Catholics. Yet it is now axiomatic that such
speech, however offensive to mainstream values solicitous of racial and
religious tolerance, is nevertheless protected unless it poses a clear and
present danger of lawless action, a test that requires that the impending
violence be imminent and likely. 98
The closest Reverend Falwell could come to a Supreme Court case
that strongly supported his claim was Beauharnais v. Illinois. 99 Beauharnais was a criminal libel case, involving an Illinois statute that
criminalized any publication that portrayed "depravity, criminality,
unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color,
creed or religion" which exposed them "to contempt, derision, or
obloquy or which is productive of breach of the peace or riots." 100 A
racist Chicago organization known as the White Circle League of
America distributed leaflets calling on the Mayor and City Council of
Chicago "to halt the further encroachment, harassment and invasion
of white people, their property, neighborhoods and persons, by the
Negro." 101 The leaflet called on " [o ]ne million self respecting people
to unite," and proclaimed that "[i]f persuasion and the need to prevent
the white race from becoming mongrelized by the negro will not unite
us, then the aggressions, . . . rapes, robberies, knives, guns and
marijuana of the negro, surely will." 102
The defendant Beauharnais was president of the White Circle League,
and in his defense to the Illinois criminal prosecution he asked that the

97. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982); Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969); Terminiello v. Chicago,
337 U.S. I, 4 (1949).
98. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
See also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
99. 343 u.s. 250 (1952).
100. /d. at 251 (quoting section 224a of Illinois Criminal Code, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, div.
1, § 471 (1949)).
101. 343 U.S. at 252.
102. /d.
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jury be instructed that he could not be found guilty unless the leaflets ·
were "likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious
substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance
or unrest." 103 The court refused to use this instruction, and Beauharnais
was convicted. The United States Supreme Court affirmed.
Beauharnais has never been explicitly overruled; if it remains good
law it is powerful support for Falwell's claim. The only social harms
caused by the speech in Beauharnais were the distress the leaflets surely
inflicted on black citizens in Chicago, and the racial intolerance the
leaflets may have whipped up in the hearts and minds of some Chicago
whites. Despite the label "criminal libel," the speech was not libelous
in the accepted sense of that term, because it contained no reputationinjuring false statements of fact. The leaflets were pure hysterical
diatribe-expressions of racist opinion calculated to create hate. No
clear and present danger to any more palpable social interest was
established-the Supreme Court deemed the repugnance of the message
alone as sufficient to support the conviction. Reverend Falwell's case,
indeed, is even stronger than Beauharnais. In his suit the emotional
distress is focused on a single individual and supported by actual
evidence; in Beauharnais the diffused distress was suffered, one must
assume, by the entire black population of Chicago. Conventional libel
doctrine has always disqualified such generalized racial or religious
group references as too large to support liability .1 04 Furthermore, the
elements of emotional distress that Falwell established actually protected
the defendant more than did the Illinois criminal statute. 105
Beauharnais, however, must be regarded as a dead case. The Supreme
Court in Garrison v. Louisiana 106 struck down a Louisiana criminal
libel law for failing to satisfy the actual malice standard of New York
Times Co. v. Sul/ivan. 101 One might argue, of course, that Beauharnais

103. /d. at 253.
104. See, e.g., Khalid Abdullah Tariq Al Mansour Faissal Fahd AI Tala! v. Fanning, 506 F.
Supp. 186 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (no action could be maintained for reference to 600 million Muslims);
Puerto Rican Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Grace, 9 MediaL. Rep. (BNA) 1514 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1983) (no action could be maintained for reference to 900,000 Puerto Ricans). See also Kentucky
Fried Chicken of Bowling Green, Inc. v. Sanders, 563 S.W.2d 8 (Ky. 1978); Granger v. Time,
Inc., 174 Mont. 42, 568 P.2d 535 (1977); Macaulay v. Bryan, 75 Nev. 278, 339 P.2d 377 (1959);
McCollough v. Cities Service Co., 676 P.2d 833 (Okla. 1984).
105. See supra text accompanying note 35.
106. 379 u.s. 64 (1964).
107. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See also Toilet v. United States, 485 F.2d 1087, 1094-99 (8th Cir.
1983) (striking down as unconstitutional federal act prohibiting mailing of "libelous, scurrilous,
defamatory, or threatening" material); Kelly, Criminal Libel and Free Speech, 6 KAN. L. REv.
295 (1958).
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with a New York Times standard superimposed upon it could still
stand, and that Falwell's claim would fit this remodeled version of
Beauharnais because it was supported by intentional or reckless conduct.108 This argument, however, is flawed for the same reason that the
Fourth Circuit's analysis in Falwell was flawed-it assumes the first
amendment should treat intent to publish a false defamatory fact as
equivalent to intent to inflict severe distress through inflammatory
opinion. 109 To inflame is not the same as to defame, however, and
modern first amendment jurisprudence has passed Beauharnais by.
Something more than inflammatory, racist rhetoric is now required
to support abridgement of free speech. Beauharnais cannot survive side
by side with cases such as Brandenburg v. Ohio 110 and Hess v. Indiana. 111
Brandenburg involved a Ku Klux Klan rally with racist speech more
incendiary than the leaflets in Beauharnais-statements such as ''the
nigger should be returned to Africa, the Jew to Israel," 112 and "if our
President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the
white, Caucasian race, it's possible that there might have to be some
revengence taken. " 113 Rejuvenating the Holmes/Brandeis clear and present danger test, 114 the Supreme Court held this speech was fully protected
by the first amendment. 115
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Hustler makes it abundantly
clear that it is the Brandenburg strain of the first amendment tradition,
and not the Beauharnais strain, which is to dominate the first amendment jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court. Nothing more powerfully

108. This would track the analysis of the Fourth Circuit in Falwell, with the added support
of refitted Beauharnais. See supra text accompanying notes 35-40.
109. See infra text accompanying notes 136-56.
110. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
Ill. 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam).
112. 395 U.S. at 447.
113. /d. at 446.
114. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374-79 (Brandeis, J., concurring); Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). For an excellent review of the evolution of the
Holmes/Brandeis clear and present danger test through Brandenburg, see J. NowAK, R. RoTUNDA
& J. YoUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§§ 16.13-16.15, at 854-65 (3d ed. 1986) (hereinafter J. NOWAK).
See also D. SMITH, ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR.: DEFENDER OF LmERTY AND LAW 23-31, 92-93
(1986).
115. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). See also Hess v. Indiana,
414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (per curiam); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706 (1969) (per
curiam) (First amendment protected statement that: "If they ever make me carry a rifle the first
man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J. They are not going to make me kill my black brothers.");
Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966) (first amendment protected Julian Bond's support of Student
Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) statement criticizing war in Vietnam and draft laws).
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illustrates this theme of Hustler than the exceptionally short shrift Chief
Justice Rehnquist gave to Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire. 116
In Chaplinsky, the Supreme Court upheld a criminal conviction
against a Jehovah's Witness for uttering "fighting words" to a city
marshall in the course of an incident arising from a hostile crowd
reaction to the appellant's proselytizing on the street. The Court stated
that certain "well-defined and limited" classes of speech "have never
been thought to raise any constitutional problem," including "the
insulting or 'fighting' words-those which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." 117 In the
years since Chaplinsky, the Court has limited the "fighting words"
concept to face-to-face confrontations that threaten to provoke immediate violence. 118 Indeed, the Court in Chaplinsky stated that "[t]he test
is what men of common intelligence would understand would be words
likely to cause an average addressee to fight." 119
Most significantly for the purposes of Reverend Falwell's claim, the
Supreme Court has rejected the view that vulgarities may be penalized
merely because they offend the recipient's sensibilities. In Cohen v.
California, 120 in which the defendant wore the words "fuck the draft"
on his jacket, the Court emphasized that the state was not exercising
its police power ''to prevent a speaker from intentionally provoking a
given group to a hostile reaction." 121 Rather, the state was attempting
to penalize only the fact of communication. 122 This, the Court held,
the state could not do:
How is one to distinguish this from any other offensive word?
Surely the state has no legal right to cleanse public debate to the
point where it is grammatically palatable to the most squeamish
among us . . . . For, while the particular four-letter word being
litigated here is perhaps more distasteful than most others of its
genre, it is nevertheless often true that one man's vulgarity is
another's lyric. 123

116. 315 u.s. 568 (1942).
117. /d. at 571-72.
118. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971). ("No individual actually or likely
to be present could reasonably have regarded the words . . . as a direct personal insult.")
(emphasis added).
119. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
120. 403 u.s. 15 (1970).
121. /d. at 20.
122. !d. at 18.
123. !d. at 25.
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Similarly, in Street v. New York, 124 a flag desecration case, the Court
wrote:
[A)ny shock effect of appellant's speech must be attributed to the
content of the ideas expressed. It is firmly settled that under our
Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited
merely because the ideas themselves are offensive to some of their
hearers. 125

The ad parody in Falwell was neither gentle nor genteel; its shock
effect was purposeful, and to most, offensive. The parody could not
be penalized for that offensive shock effect alone, however, without
turning back the clock on decades of first amendment doctrine. And
that the Supreme Court refused to do.
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the principal touchstone for intentional infliction of emotional distress is whether the
conduct is such that "an average member of the community . . .
[would] exclaim, 'Outrageous!"' 126 When dealing with non-speech conduct, the epithet "Outrageous!" may be a useful description of the
type of conduct the tort seeks to proscribe. But nothing could be more
antithetical to settled first amendment doctrine than the notion that
speech may be penalized merely for being "outrageous." The clear and
present danger test is meaningless if merely outrageous speech may be
penalized; Nazis and Ku Kluxers might as well be summarily rounded
up. The current law of obscenity would be obsolete under the Restatement test, for a large part of what is currently classified colloqui~lly
as "pornographic" but not obscene would suddenly lose its first amendment protection if the test were whether the average member of the
community found it "outrageous." The Critical Legal Studies and Law
and Economics movements are both at times "outrageous," and not
above inflicting a little emotional distress in the process. Lenny Bruce
was "outrageous." Saturday Night Live, Monty Python, and Doonesbury are often "outrageous." It is because they are outrageous that
they are funny. It is because they are outrageous that they are effective.
In comedy and in social critique, it works when it hurts.

D.

The Vagueness of the "Outrageous," "Immoral," and
"Indecent" Standards
In stating that public discourse would suffer little or no harm if
speech such as the Hustler ad parody were excluded from the market, 127
124.
125.
(1959).
126.
127.

394

u.s.

576 (1969).

/d. at 592.

See also Kingsley Int'l. Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688-89

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment d.

Hustler, _ _ u.s. a t - - · 108 S. Ct. at 881.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist revealed what was probably the most important
influence on his own analysis. What concerned the Chief Justice most
was "separation." The Court could find, he argued, no principled basis
for separating protected from unprotected speech in this context. Whether
or not such a separating standard exists, the Court was "quite sure
that the pejorative description 'outrageous' does not supply one." 128
The chill on the exercise of free expression posed by the Fourth
Circuit's use of the emotional distress cause of action was compounded
by the speaker's inability to predict what a jury will determine to be
"out of bounds" in terms of "decency" or "morality." The critical
operative standard for this tort, when applied in the speech context, is
thus impermissibly vague. To be actionable, the speech must offend
"generally accepted standards of decency and morality." 129 The damages
award in Falwell was punishment for having run afoul of that standard.
Under the related doctrines of overbreadth and vagueness, speech may
not be penalized when the controlling standard is capable of sweeping
and improper application, 130 or if its terms are "so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application." 131 An amorphous and fluid standard such as the
phrase "generally accepted standards of decency and morality" invites
a jury to impose liability because of its distaste for the publisher, rather
than for any concrete harm caused by what is published. 132 Any attempt
to prosecute Hustler magazine for obscenity under a legal standard
penalizing the publication of material offending "generally accepted
standards of decency and morality" would violate the Supreme Court's
requirements of specific definition. 133 The Supreme Court first noted in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan that the financial penalties of a libel
judgment may be exponentially more punishing than the corresponding
maximum fine for criminal libel; 134 so too, the damages awarded in a
private suit for infliction of emotional distress may be far more punitive
than the fine exacted in an obscenity conviction. If a state may not

128. Id. at - - · 108 S. Ct. at 881-82.
129. Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (1974). This standard essentially
tracks the Restatement, which speaks of conduct "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment d.
130. See J. NowAK, supra note 114; §§ 16.8, 16.9, at 840-47.
131. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 249 (1967).
132. See Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 295 (1951); Givelber, The Right to Minimum
Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by
Outrageous Conduct, 82 CoLUM. L. REv. 42, 52 (1982).
133. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
134. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277-78 (1964). See generally Wheeler,
The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REv. 269 (1983).
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criminally penalize as obscene speech falling within the vague rubric of
"indecent" or "immoral," it certainly should not be permitted to
accomplish that same end through its tort system. 135

E.

Emotional Distress and Outrageous Opinion

The jury's specific finding that no reasonable person could interpret
the ad parody as a literal misstatement of fact 136 renders the Hustler
case indistinguishable from Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass•n v.
Bresler. 131 In Bresler, the Supreme Court held that, as a matter of law,
the word "blackmail" in the particular circumstances of the case was
not actionable:
It is simply impossible to believe that a reader who reached the
word "blackmail" in either article would not have understood
exactly what was meant: it was Bresler's public and wholly legal
negotiating proposals that were being criticized. No reader could
have thought that . . . their words were charging Bresler with the
commission of a criminal offense. On the contrary, even the most
careless reader must have perceived that the word was no more
than rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet used by those who
considered Bresler's negotiating position extremely unreasonable. 138

One must remember that the Court necessarily decided Bresler as a
matter of federal constitutional law. The Supreme Court's ruling that
the language was "rhetorical hyperbole," and therefore not actionable,
was not an exercise in interpreting common law tort doctrine; instead,
it was a holding that the first amendment forbids exacting tort penalties
that no reasonable reader could interpret as misstatements of fact.
Surely, Bresler, the plaintiff, suffered severe emotional distress from
being the object of a "vigorous epithet" in a heated community
controversy. To believe that if Bresler had been clever enough to include
in his lawsuit a supplementary cause of action for emotional distress,
the Supreme Court would have reached a different result on that claim,
however, is impossible. 139

135. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 779 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasing "largely uncontrolled" freedom of juries to levy punitive
damages awards "in wholly unpredictable amounts bearing no necessary relation to the actual
harm caused").
136. 797 F.2d at 1273.
137. 398 u.s. 6 (1970).
138. Id. at 14.
139. See Blatty v. New York Times Co., 421 Cal. 3d 1033, 728 P.2d ll77, ll84, 232 Cal.
Rptr. 542, 549 (1986):
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In Old Dominion Branch No. 96, National Ass'n of Letter Carriers
v. Austin, 140 the Supreme Court addressed language every bit as emotionally incendiary as the ad parody at issue here. In the midst of a
heated labor dispute, a union newsletter printed a "List of Scabs" and
included Jack London's definition of a scab. 141 That definition, the
Court stated, was "merely rhetorical hyperbole, a lusty and imaginative
expression of the contempt felt by union members towards those who
refuse to join. " 142
The Court in Letter Carriers obviously believed that this "lusty and
imaginative expression of contempt" was designed to inflict distressto express disgust and contempt-and yet it was nonetheless not actionable, because one could not reasonably understand it to be a literal
misstatement of fact. Letter Carriers is an enormously important guide
to the correct resolution of the Falwell case. Letter Carriers instructs
that in the rough and tumble controversies of American life, vicious
insults designed to cause severe distress will be hurled about. But unless
that emotionally-laden speech carries with it some harm other than its

Not only does logic compel the conclusion that [f]irst [a]mendment limitations are
applicable to all claims, of whatever label, whose gravamen is the alleged injurious
falsehood of a statement, but so too does a very pragmatic concern. If these
limitations applied only to actions denominated "defamation," they would furnish
little if any protection to free-speech and free-press values: plaintiffs suing press
defendants might simply affix a label other than "defamation" to their injuriousfalsehood claims ... and thereby avoid the operation of the limitations and frustrate
their underlying purpose.
140. 418 u.s. 264 (1974).
141. The offending newsletter read:
After God had finished the rattlesnake, the toad, and the vampire, He had some
awful substance left with which He made a scab.
A scab is a two-legged animal with a corkscrew soul, a water brain, a combination
backbone of jelly and glue. Where others have hearts, he carries a tumor of rotten
principles.
When a scab comes down the street, men turn their backs and Angels weep in
Heaven, and the Devil shuts the gates of hell to keep him out.
No man (or woman) has a right to scab so long as there is a pool of water to
drown his carcass in, or a rope long enough to hang his body with. Judas was a
gentleman compared with a scab. For betraying his master, he had character enough
to hang himself. A scab has not.
Esau sold his birthright for a mess of pottage. Judas sold his Savior for thirty
pieces of silver. Benedict Arnold sold his country for a promise of commission in
the British Army. The scab sells his birthright, country, his wife, his children and
his fellowmen for an unfulfilled promise from his employer.
Esau was a traitor to himself; Judas was a traitor to his God; Benedict Arnold
was a traitor to his country; a SCAB is a traitor to his God, his country, his family
and his class.
!d. at 268 (emphasis in original).
142. !d. at 285-86 (emphasis added).
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capacity to outrage, such as factual misstatements, it is not actionable.
At one time, the common law protection for "opinion" or "fair
comment" in defamation actions extended only to "fair" or "reasonable" opinions. 143 The "fairness" or "reasonableness" of the comment
was usually left. to the jury's relatively unguided judgment. 144 This
practice permitted juries to judge the "worth" of the speaker's viewpoint, and thus carried the potential for persecution of unpopular
opinion. The common law of defamation thus often permitted the
prosecution of "outrageous" opinion. 145
When the Supreme. Court stated in Gertz v. Robert Welch, ·Inc., 146
that "[u]nder the [f]irst [a]mendment there is no such thing as a false
idea,, 147 it emancipated the outrageous opinion from legal censure.
"However pernicious an opinion may seem," the Court stated, "we
depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries
but on the competition of other ideas." 148
An outrageous opinion directed against a public figure will virtually
by definition be intentionally or recklessly designed to generate severe
emotional distress. Opinions are always "intentional"; they are designed
to have an effect. 149
The ad parody in Hustler was neither true nor false. Opinions are
not true or false, but only bad or good. The jury clearly thought the
parody was bad-bad to the point of being outrageous. The use of the
Virginia cause of action for emotional distress to punish Flynt and
Hustler for speech that the jury found could not be understood as
factual thus resuscitated the discredited cause of action for outrageous
opinion. The second element of the cause of action, the requirement
that the conduct "offends generally accepted standards of decency or
morality, " 150 requires that the judge and jury do what Gertz forbids:
examine their consciences to determine if Flynt's opinion was "indecent" or "immoral."
Significantly, Virginia's own courts had interpreted the protection
for opinions quite expansively. In Crawford v. United Steelworkers,
AFC-CI0, 151 the Virginia Supreme Court engaged in an analysis of the
143.
144.
145.
L. REv.
146.
147.
148.
149.
ISO.
151.

R. SMOLLA, supra note 29, § 6.02[3].
See R. SACK, supra note 14, § IV.3.6; R. SMOLLA, supra note 28, § 6.02[3].
See Hill, Defamation and Invasion of Privacy Under the First Amendment, 16 CoLUM.
1205, 1233 (1984).
418 u.s. 323 (1974).
/d. at 339.
/d. at 339-40 (emphasis added).
See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (1974).
230 Va. 217, 335 S.E.2d 828 (1985).
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Supreme Court's decision in Bresler that seemed to precurse the Supreme
Court's ultimate analysis in Hustler.
By the same token, the words upon which the trial court fashioned
liability here will not support recovery. The words are disgusting,
abusive, repulsive, and are in no way condoned by this Court.
Nevertheless, they cannot reasonably be understood, under the
circumstances of this labor dispute, to convey a false representation
of fact. To call a person a "cocksucker" does not, under the
circumstances of this labor dispute, convey the false representation
that the individual engaged in sodomy. Nor does calling a person
a "motherfucker, '' under the circumstances of this case, convey the
false representation that the person engaged in incest. Because this
was a labor dispute and considering the way in which the words
were used, these repulsive words will not support liability. 152

The Fourth Circuit had mistakenly reasoned that absolute protection
for opinion is irrelevant when the purpose of the cause of action is not
to vindicate the victim's reputation, but to compensate the victim for
the opinion's capacity to emotionally disturb. 153 But the modern protection for opinion comes not from the elements of the tort of defamation, but from the first amendment. 154 That the fact/ opinion

152. /d. at 234-35, 335 S.E.2d at 838-39 (emphasis added). If, under the analysis in Crawford,
the free speech values surrounding a labor dispute protect the statement "you are a motherfucker,"
one would expect the first amendment to also protect an ad parody with incest as its central
theme, when in the parody it is clear that the point is made not for its factual value but as an
attack on perceived hyprocrisy.
153. 797 F.2d at 1276.
154. See generally R. SMOLLA, supra note 29, at § 6.02[4], 6.03. See also Oilman v. Evans,
750 F.2d 970, 975 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citation omitted) (en bane), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127
(1985) ("Although [the] claim arises under the District of Columbia common law of libel, . . .
the issue whether the allegedly libelous statements are protected opinion is to be decided as a
matter of federal constitutional law.") (citing Lewis v. Time, Inc., 710 F.2d 549, 552-53 (9th Cir.
1983)); Yerkie v. Post-Newsweek Stations, Michigan, Inc.,;470'F. Supp. 91, 94 (D. Md. 1979);
Hoffman v. Washington Post Co., 433 F. Supp. 600, 601 (!).D.C. 1977), aff'd without opinion,
578 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Bucher v. Roberts, 595 P.2d 239 (Colo. 1979); Naked City, Inc.
v. Chicago Sun-Times, 77 Ill. App. 3d 188, 395 N.E.2d 1042 (1979); Mashburn v. Collin, 355
So. 2d 879, 891 (La. 1977).
The most important Supreme Court statement treating opinion as absolutely protected under
the first amendment is, of course, the famous line in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974) that "there is no such thing as a false idea." !d. at 339. Although the quoted statement
from Gertz was unabashed dictum, it has been accepted by subsequent decisions as controlling
law. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 504
(1984) (quoting the Gertz dicta with approval); Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d at 974-75 n.6; McBride
v. Merrell Dow and Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 717 F.2d 1460, 1464 & n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Lewis
v. Time, Inc., 710 F.2d at 552-53; Hammerhead Enterprises v. Brezenoff, 707 F.2d 33, 40 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 892 (1983); Rinsley v. Brandt, 700 F.2d 1304, 1307 (lOth Cir. 1983);
Church of Scientology v. Cazares, 638 F.2d 1272, 1286 (5th Cir. 1981); Avins v. White, 627 F.2d
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distinction may be irrelevant to the state definition of infliction of
emotional distress 155 does not, therefore, decide the matter. The question
is whether it is irrelevant under the first amendment. The answer
provided by Hustler v. Falwell is that the distinction is always relevant.
Opinion is always protected under the first amendment; in fact, its
absolute protection is one of the most pervasive themes of modern first
amendment jurisprudence. 156 This protection does not dissolve when the
name of the tort changes. And an opinion is no less an opinion because
it is disturbing. Under our first amendment the indecent, immoral, or
outrageous opinion must simply be tolerated by the legal system; our
society has other correctives. 157

F.

The Special Problems of Satire and Parody

Chief Justice Rehnquist is economical in his writing. The slip opinion
in Hustler consumes only eleven printed pages. Given that economy of
style, it is telling that nearly two pages of the Court's opinion would

637, 642 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 982 (1980); Orr v. Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108,
1114 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960 (1979).
Two members of the Court-Justice White and Chief Justice Rehnquist-have noted, however,
that "the problem of defamatory opinion was not remotely an issue in Gertz, and there is no
evidence that the Court was speaking with an awareness of the rich and complex history of the
struggle of the common law to deal with this problem." Miskovsky v. Oklahoma Publishing Co.,
654 P.2d 587 (Okla.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 923 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Hill,
Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 16 CoLUM. L.REv. 1205, 1239 (1976)).
155. Although the formal elements of infliction of emotional distress do not include the fact/
opinion distinction, one might nevertheless argue that this is only because the tort often encompasses conduct that has nothing to do with speech. When speech is the predicate for emotional
distress liability, however, a persuasive argument can be made that only speech reasonably
understood as factual may support liability, because only factual speech carries the potential for
severe distress in a reasonable person. As discussed subsequently, the common law position is
already quite close to this proposition, for traditionally the law of torts has disqualified mere
verbal abuse, insults, and epithets as grounds for liability under any tort theory. See infra text
accompanying notes 183-84.
156. It is worth noting, for example, that even Judge Robert Bork, who came under severe
fire in his Supreme Court nomination hearings for harboring an overly restrictive view of the
first amendment, authored a stirring and persuasive first amendment analysis of the fact/opinion
distinction in which the first amendment protections for opinion were treated quite expansively.
See Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d at 993 (Bork., J ., concurring).
157. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974). For a sampling of the
rich judicial effort to devise effective protection for opinion, compare Oilman, 150 F.2d 970
(applying four factor test) with Shiver v. Apalachee Publishing Co., 425 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983) (distinction "a judgment call") and Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910,
913 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Hotchner v. Doubleday & Co., 434 U.S. 834 (1977)
(emphasizing "verifiability") and Information Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp.,
611 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1980); Burns v. McGraw-Hill Broadcasting Co., 659 P.2d 1351, 1360
(Colo. 1983) (applying three factor test); Cole v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 386 Mass. 303,
309, 435 N.E.2d 1021, 1025, cerr. denied, 459 U.S. 1037 (1982).
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be taken up by what can only be described as homage to the great
American tradition of parody and satire. 158
The fact that speech is satiric should not, standing alone, either
enhance or diminish the protection to which the speech is otherwise
entitled under the first amendment. Labeling speech "satire" or "parody" does not talismanically immunize that speech from all legal
restraint. If the satirist goes beyond the scope of the fair use doctrine
in taking from a copyrighted work, for example, he may be legitimately
subjected to the penalties of the copyright act. 159 If the satirist crosses
the line into the legally obscene, or the commercially fraudulent, the
speech may be regulated. 160
At the same time, satiric speech is in no sense a second-class first
amendment citizen. Whatever level of first amendment protection the
speech would otherwise enjoy is not diminished by the fact that it is
spiced with humor. More importantly, the satirist's first amendment
protection is not lessened because the speech is cruel, crude, meanspirited, unfair, or viciously biting. In the defamation context, it has
long been axiomatic that common law malice-hatred, spite, or illwill-is not enough to satisfy the "knowing or reckless" actual malice
test of New York Times. 161 The hatred with which speech is expressed
does not affect its value in the marketplace of ideas. American life is
replete with examples of speech lying at the core of first amendment
protections, dripping with venom. 162

158. See _ _ u.s. at _ _ , 108 s. Ct. at 881.
159. See Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd by an equally divided
Court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
160. See Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
161. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 754 (1985);
Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 10 n.3 (1970); Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964); Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir. 1976);
Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341, 1350 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Postill v. Booth
Newspapers, Inc., 118 Mich. App. 608, 626, 325 N.W.2d 511, 516 (1982); Novi Ambulance, Inc.
v. Farmington Observer, II Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1644, 1646 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1985); Nevada
Broadcasting v. Allen, 669 P.2d 337, 344 (Nev. 1983).
Although it is error to confuse common law "ill will" malice with constitutional "actual
malice," it is perfectly proper to permit the existence or nonexistence of common law ill will
malice to be established as evidence probative of the existence or nonexistence of actual malice.
Courts permit evidence of iU will, hatred, or spite to be introduced for whatever weight it deserves
on the actual malice question, with the caveat that ill will, hatred, or spite standing alone can
never establish knowing or reckless disregard for the truth. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of United States, Inc., 692 F.2d 189, 196 (1st Cir. 1982), aff'd on other grounds, 466 U.S.
485 (1984); Cochran v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 372 N.E.2d 1211, 1220 (Ind. App. 1978);
DiLorenzo v. New York News, Inc., 81 A.D.2d 844, 432 N.Y.S.2d 483, 487 (1981); Hellman v.
McCarthy, 10 Med. L. Rep. (BNA) 1789, 1794 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
162. See generally, Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation and the Law of Libel, Trademark, and
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Satire is often effective precisely because it is shocking to mainstream
cultural sensibilities. The satirist's very purpose is often to be "outrageous" and "indecent," to incite anger, revulsion, and controversy . 163
The ''bite'' of satire is often its potency:
Thus, satire is a potent form of social commentary which attempts
to expose the foibles and follies of society in direct, biting, critical,
and often harsh language-tempered by humor. Highet describes
the "typical weapons of satire-irony, paradox, antithesis, parody,
colloquialism, anticlimax, topicality, obscenity, violence, vividness,
[and] exaggeration." He identifies three attributes of satiric writing:
1) it describes "a painful or absurd situation or a foolish or wicked
person or group as vividly as possible;" 2) it uses sharply critical
language including callous, crude, obscene or taboo words in order
to shock and disturb the reader; and 3) it attempts to evoke an
emotion in the reader which blends amusement and contempt, hatred
and laughter. 164

As Judge J. Harve Wilkinson pointed out in his dissent from the
Fourth Circuit's denial of rehearing en bane, "[s]atire is particularly
relevant to political debate because it tears down facades, deflates
stuffed shirts, and unmasks hypocrisy. By cutting through the constraints imposed by pomp and ceremony, it is a form of irreverence as
welcome as fresh air.'' 165

Copyright: Remedies Without Wrong, 65 B. U.L. REv. 923, 924-26 (1985). See also infra text
accompanying notes 165-75.
163. See L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987); Dorsen, supra
note 125, at 924-26.
164. Dorsen, supra note 162, at 924 (quoting G. HIGHET, THE ANATOMY OF SATIRE 16-18
(1962)).
165. Falwell v. Flynt, 805 F.2d 484, 487 (4th Cir. 1986) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting from denial
of rehearing). Judge Wilkinson went on to write:
While Hustler's base parody is unworthy of this or any tradition, the precedent
created by the cause of action against this defendant may one day come to stifle
the finer forms of this genre.
The natural urge to bring down self-appointed moralists led Moliere to satirize
the French lay clergy in Tartuffe, and motivated Mencken to chastise novelists for
failing to look beneath the surface of American evangelists. Sinclair Lewis acted on
Mencken's suggestions by writing Elmer Gantry, a scathing satiric attack on the
Protestant clergy and the public's wiilingness to boost demagogues to positions of
influence. E. Martin, H.L. Mencken, and the Debunkers 123 (1984).
Public moralists have not been the only victims of the satirist's wit. Despite his
enormous popularity in 1789, George Washington was once depicted on a donkey
led by his aide David Humphreys over the caption, "The glorious time has come to
pass/When David shall conduct an ass." S. HESS & M. KAPLAN, THE UNGENTLEMANLY
ART: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PoLITICAL CARTOONS 61 (1968). Thomas Jefferson
was forced to endure vicious rumors spread by general gossip as well as by his
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Satire about public persons and public issues lies at the core of first
amendment protection because the emotive aspect of the speech is
inextricably intertwined with its cognitive content. As the Supreme
Court stated in Cohen v. Ca/ifornia: 166
[W]e cannot overlook the fact, because it is well illustrated by the
episode involved here, that much linguistic expression serves a dual
communicative function: it conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible
emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for their
emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that
the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function
which, practically speaking, may often be the more important
element of the overall message sought to be communicated. 167 ·

One unavoidable consequence of satire's emotive power is its greater
capacity to inflict pain than that of other genres of speech. It is a fact
of American life that an attack on a public figure in a context such as
Doonesbury may have more impact than scores of detached analytic
essays by commentators on op-ed pages. It has never been part of our
first amendment jurisprudence, however, to penalize speech because it
is effective.
The satire that Hustler published in this case was admittedly crude.
Judge Wilkinson described it as a "base parody" that is "unworthy"
of the grand American tradition of public satire. 168 If it is "unworthy,"
however, it is only unworthy of praise as particularly humorous, clever,

political enemies. For example, he was drawn as a lecherous beast who waited in
his shirttails outside his wife's bedroom and as the keeper of a slave harem who
actioned his mulatto offspring into slavery. See V. DABNUEY, THE JEFFERSON
ScANDALs: A REBUTTAL 9-15 (1981). Similarly, political cartoonists have portrayed
Grover Cleveland as the father of an illegitimate child, pictured James Garfield as
an unwed mother in a dress, and lambasted Ulysses S. Grant as an incompetent
drunk. See generally, S. HESS & M. KAPLAN, supra; W. MURRELL, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN GRAPHIC HUMOR (1967).
William Charles, America's first widely acclaimed political cartoonist, found it
expedient to leave Scotland in 1806 after he published an irreverent cartoon. The
cartoon, "A Fallen Pillar of the Kirk," showed a clergyman bouncing a barebosomed young woman on his knee while exclaiming, "Oh Lord, what good things
dost thou provide for us men!" W. MURREL, at 80. More recently, Garry Trudeau's
Doonesbury has satirized the sanctuary movement of the liberation theologians and
the Rev. Pat Robertson's direct line to divine inspiration.
/d. at 487.
166. 403 u.s. 15 (1971).
167. !d. at 25-26.
168. 805 F.2d at 487.
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or tasteful. It is certainly not "unworthy" of first amendment protection.169 The Court's famous statement in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 170 describing a profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be ''uninhibited, robust, and wideopen" 171 was not a mere slogan. The words "uninhibited" and "wideopen" gather their force when they are extended to protect speech at
the fringes, speech that is indecorous and irreverent. No first amendment
would be necessary if all American speech were polite, genteel, and
restrained. 172 But, as the Court in New York Times emphasized, our
national character is more robust; our marketplace of speech ''may
well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks. " 173
The satiric attack on Reverend Falwell was also couched in a form
outside of conventional mores. That, however, cannot be enough to
diminish its first amendment protection. For if the attack is not otherwise
punishable-if it is not legally obscene, if it does not contain defamatory
lies, if it does not pose a clear and present danger of violence-it may
not be proscribed merely because it is unconventional or unorthodox.
As the Court put it in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnett, 174 "(i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation,
it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion." 175
169.

As James Madison explained:
Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of everything, and in no
instance is this more true than in that of the press. It has accordingly been decided
... that it is better to leave a few of its noxious branches to their luxuriant growth,
than by pruning them away, to injure the vigor of those yielding proper fruits.
Stephens v. Thieriot, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2143, 2147-48 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (quoting
Fellows v. National Enquirer, Inc., 42 Cal. 3d 234, 252, 721 P.2d 97, 109, 228 Cal. Rptr. 215,
227-28 (1986)); see also F. Morr, JEFFERSON AND THE PREss 38-43 (1943).
170. 376 u.s. 254 (1964).
171. /d. at 270.
172. The threat is by no means limited to commentary, but may also extend to more traditional
forms of reporting. In the political arena, for example, it is common for the press to report on
competing candidates who make vituperous comments about their opponents. Historically, the
courts have been loathe to permit such political controversies to serve as the basis for defamation
actions on the theory that: "Political conduct and views which some respectable people approve,
and others condemn, are constantly imputed to [politicians] . . . . Whatever is added to the field
of libel is taken from the field of free debate." Sweeny v. Patteson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C.
Cir. 1942). See generally R. SAcK, supra note 14, at §§ IV.2.4, IV.2.5., at 160-61. If a politician
is no longer required to prove publication of a known reckless defamatory falsehood, and instead
may recover simply on a showing of intent to cause him emotional distress, the values protected
by New York Times and its progeny will be severely undermined.
173. 376 U.S. at 270.
174. 319 u.s. 624 (1943).
175. Id. at 642.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist's tribute to this cultural and legal tradition
was quite eloquent-even moving. "Despite their sometimes caustic
nature, . . . graphic depictions and satirical cartoons have played a
prominent role in public and political debate." 176 "From the viewpoint
of history," the Chief Justice observed "it is clear that our political
discourse would have been considerably poorer without them." 177
Recognizing absolute protection for speech inflicting emotional distress on public figures does not leave the public figure· remediless; the
natural remedies of the market are available. The two central rationales
supporting the Supreme Court's current defamation rules apply well to
emotional distress suits predicated on satiric attacks upon public figures.
The first is the assumption of risk rationale. In Gertz, the Court
reasoned that one who enters the public arena must accept an increased
risk of defamation as part of the price of fame and influence. 178 This
aspect of Gertz largely reflects the common sense dicta that he who
enters the kitchen must accept the heat of the fire. If first amendment
principles require that public figures assume some enhanced risk that
others will lie about them, then surely they also accept an increased
risk of being subjected to emotional distress.
In a pluralistic culture-a culture diverse enough to count both Jerry
Falwell and Larry Flynt within its constellation of influential public
figures-it is inevitable that prominent individuals will be occasionally
subjected to unwanted and severe emotional distress. In candor, both
Larry Flynt and Reverend Falwell occupy positions in the spectrum of
American life that are likely to evoke deep feelings of loyalty and
affection from some quarters, and disgust and revulsion from others.
To be attacked with intensity is never pleasant. The first amendment,
however, requires Reverend Falwell to assume the risk as part of the
price of his political and religious ministry. As Professor Magruder
noted long ago, "[a]gainst a large part of the frictions and irritations
and clashing of temperaments incident to participation in community
life, a certain toughening of the mental hide is a better protection than
the law could ever be ... upon the contrary, it would be unfortunate
if the law closed all safety valves through which irascible tempers might
legally blow off steam. " 179 Although Professor Magruder was writing
about sound management of the tort system, fifty years later his words

176. _ _ U.S. at--· 108 S. Ct. at 881.
177. /d.
178. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
179. Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Low of Torts, 49 HARv. L. REv.
1033, 1035 (1936).
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have taken on a constitutional dimension. Gertz teaches that there is
an assumption of risk component to the first amendment. This assumption of risk is an essential element to a pluralistic, robust, and
open culture. In the words of Judge Cardozo, "[t]he timorous may
stay at home." 180
This author has expressed the lament in the context of libel that we
are witnessing the collective thinning of the American skin. 181 The view
may well be every bit as apt for the tort of infliction of emotional
distress:
What the libel explosion does to the free expression interests of
the media, however, may in the end be less significant than what
it does to the free expression interests of ordinary private citizens.
For if we take the libel suit too seriously, we are in danger of
raising our collective cultural sensitivity to reputation to unhealthy
levels. We are in danger of surrendering a wonderful part of our
national identity-our strapping, scrambling, free-wheeling
individualism, in danger of becoming less American, less robust,
wild-eyed, pluralistic and free, and more decorous, image-conscious,
and narcissistic. The media is itself partly to blame for this direction,
and it would be dangerous to release it totally from the important
check and balance that the libel laws provide. But in the United
States, the balance that must be struck between reputation and
expression should never be tilted too far against expression, for the
right to defiantly, robustly, and irrevently speak one's mind just
because it is one's mind is quintessentially what it means to be an
American. 182

The second rationale articulated in Gertz was the counterspeech
principle. Public officials and public figures, the Court reasoned, are
more likely to have effective opportunities for self-help when they are
defamed; their very prominence ensures some degree of access to the
media, permitting them to address the lie with counterspeech. 183 If
access to the media as a means of self-help justifies substantial first
amendment protection for defamatory speech, it justifies constitutional
protection of speech that has merely inflicted emotional injury even

180. Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., Inc., 250 N.Y. 479, 166 N.E. 173, 174 (1929).
Cardozo continued: "The antics of the clown are not the paces of the cloistered cleric. The rough
and boisterous joke, the horseplay of the crowd, evokes its own guffaws, but they are not the
pleasures of tranquility. The plairniff was not seeking a retreat for meditation." /d. Neither, one
may surmise, was Reverend Falwell.
181. R. SMOLLA, supra note 14, at 3-25.
182. Id. at 257.
183. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
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more. Regardless of the technical name given to a cause of action, the
common law has always been extraordinarily wary of permitting recovery for name-calling, insults, epithets, and verbal abuse. This wariness
stems not only from the assumption of risk principle, but from the
secondary rationale that such language reflects as negatively on the
speaker as on the victim. 184 The modern first amendment counterpart
to this wisdom is that a public figure subjected to an outrageous satiric
attack may be very well able to turn the tables on his attacker by using
the media to display his outrage.
The Hustler case vividly illustrates the power of such counterspeech.
Exercising his own first amendment prerogative, Reverend Falwell
launched an impressive counterattack against Flynt and Hustler magazine. Reverend Falwell's Moral Majority, Inc., sent out three mailings
in response.· The first, a mailing to 500,000 "rank-and-file" members,
described the Hustler parody and asked for contributions to help Falwell
"defend his mother's memory. " 185 A second mailing to 26,900 "major
donors" included a copy of the parody itself, with eight of the most
offensive words blacked out. 186 A third mailing signed by Falwell, under
the auspices of his television show The Old Time Gospel Hour, was
sent to 750,000 persons. 187 Reverend Falwell also used his television
program to discuss the parody and counterattack Flynt, displaying the
ad on nation-wide television. 188 Within thirty days of the mailings, the
Moral Majority received $45,000, and The Old Time Gospel Hour
received $672,000. 189 Falwell used the media to attack Flynt with specific
reference to the parody, as well as to attack pornography more generally. These attacks did not mince words. Falwell wrote, for example:

184. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Birdsong, 360 F.2d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 1966). No matter
how mean or vulgar, for example, mere insults, epithets, and name-calling are not deemed
defamatory. See, e.g., Church of Scientology v. Cazares, 638 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1981); Held v.
Pokorny, 583 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Lamelza v. Bally's Park Place, Inc., 580 F. Supp.
445 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Crozman v. Callahan, 136 F. Supp. 466 (W.D. Okla. 1955); Morairty v.
Lippe, 162 Conn. 371, 294 A.2d 326 (1972); Rice v. Simmons, 2 Del. 417 (1838); Stanley v.
Taylor, 4 Ill. App. 3d 98, 278 N.E.2d 824 (1972); Durr v. Smith, 90 So. 2d 137 (La. Ct. App.
1956); Bartow v. Smith, 149 Ohio St. 301, 305, 78 N.E.2d 735, 737 (1948); Blouin v. Anton, 139
Vt. 618, 431 A.2d 489 (1981).
185. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1150 (9th Cir. 1986).
Hustler, never lacking for temerity, sued Falwell for violating Hustler's copyright in the ad parody.
The Ninth Circuit held that Falwell's use of the ad parody to counterattack Hustler was a fair
use under the copyright law. !d.
186. /d.
187 !d.
188. !d.
189. /d.
0
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Now pornography has thrust its ugly head into our everyday lives
and is multiplying like a filthy plague. . . . And there, in my
opinion, is clear proof that the billion dollar sex industry, of which
Larry Flynt is a self-declared leader, is preying on innocent, impressionable children to feed the lusts of depraved adults. For those
porno peddlers, it appears that lust and greed have replaced decency
and morality. 190

This counterattack by Falwell is precisely the sort of self-help remedy
the Supreme Court contemplated in Gertz. Rather than use the media
to "counter the lie," of course, Falwell used it to "counter the distress,"
by bluntly and colorfully attacking Flynt. That attack was financially
lucrative for Falwell, and it combined his own emotive and cognitive
use of language to further his own ideological positions. This is exactly
the sort of response that the first amendment is intended to encourage.
The salvos between Flynt and Falwell give true meaning to the ideal of
wide-open and robust speech. Nothing could be more antithetical to
first amendment values, however, than to give to either side the option
of invoking the heavy machinery of the state tort system to exact
compensation and punitive damages for the hurt feelings that inevitably
accompany these rough exchanges.
V.

A.

PLACING LIMITS ON FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS

Will the First Amendment Swallow Emotional Distress?

If first amendment doctrines are potent enough to destroy Falwell's

claim, are they too potent? 191 Does disqualifying Reverend Falwell from
recovery necessarily interfere with the tort of infliction of emotional
distress in all situations in which speech is a component of the distressinflicting conduct? When the speech is an element of some other
oppressive, coercive, or harrassing activity, might it not, in combination
with that other activity, create a cause of action that would raise less
serious first amendment objections? Infliction of emotional distress by
an oppressive bill collector, or through sexual harrassment on the job,
may be effectuated by "speech." But the gravamen of the tortious
activity in such cases is arguably the proscription of underlying non-

190. /d. at 1153 n.7.
191. The Hustler case was not the first in which an emotional distress claim was upheld
despite the failure of a defamation claim. See, e.g., Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club,
595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979) (en bane); Woodruff v. Miller, 64 N.C. App. 364, 307 S.E.2d 176
(1983). See generally Note, First Amendment Limits on Tort Liability for Words Intended to
Inflict Severe Emotional Distress, 85 CoLUM. L. REv. 1749 (1985).
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speech conduct, such as an oppressive commercial tactic, or anti-social
behavior in the workplace. The penalty exacted on speech in such cases
appears incidental to the governmental purpose of regulating more
palpable harms, rather than regulating the purely expressive component
of the conduct. 192
There has been much discussion about the potential capacity of the
emotional distress tort to "swallow up" the torts of defamation and
invasion of privacy . 193 The. interrelationships between the torts of libel,
slander, false light invasion of privacy, intrusion, publication of
embarrassing facts, appropriation of likeness, and infliction of emotional distress are complex, volatile, and largely uncharted. 194 In a strict
sense, however, these issues pose no federal constitutional questions,
but are rather problems for the sound administration of state tort
systems. As far as the Constitution is concerned, a state should be free
tO combine or separate these torts as it pleases, with as much or as
little overlap in elements or functions as it deems wise. Nothing in the
first amendment, for example, necessarily dictates a rule that when a
defamation claim fails, an emotional distress claim arising from the
same facts also fails . 195
Fear that the tort of emotional distress could destroy core first
amendment values must thus be balanced against a countervailing fear
that will certainly drive many to attack the Supreme Court's ruling in
Hustler-the fear that a first amendment ruling in favor of Flynt would
effectively swallow up all claims for emotional distress. For if the first
amendment does bar Reverend Falwell's recovery against Hustler and
Flynt, what is left of tort recovery for emotional distress? Assuming
that Falwell's distress was indeed "severe," 196 that Flynt's inducement
Of that distreSS Wa5 "intentional," 197 and that the meanS USed Offended
"generally accepted standards of decency or morality," 198 is there any
type of infliction of emotional distress that survives the Supreme Court's
decision? If what Hustler published failed to pierce the shield of the
first amendment, what would?
The simple answer is that tort law may continue to permit recovery
for infliction of emotional distress, without running afoul of the first
192. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
193. SeeR. SMOLLA, supra note 29, at§ 11.01[2][b].
194. See id. at §§ 10.01, 11.01.
195. See Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979) (en bane);
Woodruff v. Miller, 64 N.C.App. 364, 307 S.E.2d 176 (1983). See infra notes 219-24 and
accompanying text.
196. See supra text accompanying note 43.
197. See supra text accompanying note 42.
198. See Wommack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338 _ _ , 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (1974).
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amendment when the tortious activity does not involve speech. This
answer, however, is easily discredited, because it is surely underinclusive.
There are too many examples of activity involving communication,
verbal or symbolic, that strike one intuitively as beyond first amendment
protection. The challenge, therefore, is to articulate some first amendment principle to guide that intuition.

B.

Non-Speech Masquerading as Speech

In certain cases, one may avoid first amendment concerns by unmasking that which purports to be communicative activity to reveal
non-speech masquerading as speech. In Johnson v. Woman's Hospital, 199 for example, the court allowed an action for infliction of emotional distress when the defendant displayed a dead newborn child in
a formaldehyde jar to the plaintiff. The mere one-sentence restatement
of the facts in Johnson is nauseating; little imagination is required to
conjure the overwhelming emotional shock that must have consumed
the plaintiff upon actually seeing the dead baby in a jar of formaldehyde. The distress, however, comes from what was seen. If recovery
was legitimate in Johnson, it must be distinguished from the distress
that results from seeing, on a magazine page, one's depiction as having
had sexual intercourse with one's mother in an outhouse.
Emotional distress cases involving visceral shock at simply observing
activity are now well established in the tort tradition. Courts have
permitted recovery for the mutilation. of a spouse's dead body, 200 for
witnessing a scene in which one's child is violently killed, 201 and even
against an estate, for the decedent's act of committing suicide in the
plaintiff's kitchen. 202 The medium through which harm is transmitted
in these cases is "communicative" in the literal sense that the emotional
injury is caused by what one absorbs by the senses in sight and sound.
The famous line of cases emenating from Dillon v. Legg, 203 indeed,
require direct sensory observance as an element of the cause of action. 204
One might argue, however, that these emotional distress cases do not
truly involve "speech," because they are all examples of the antithesis

199. 527 S.W.2d 133 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975).
200. Alderman v. Ford, 146 Kan. 698, 72 P.2d 981 (1981).
201. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
202. Blakeley v. Shortal's Estate, 236 Iowa 787, 20 N.W.2d 28 (1945).
203. 68 Cal.2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
204. See Ochoa v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 39 Cal.3d 159, 703 P.2d I, 216
Cal. Rptr. 661 (1985); Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal.3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977);
Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 63 Haw. 557 632 P 2d 1066 (1981).
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of Marshall McLuhen's statement that the "medium is the message."
In these cases there is medium but there is no message. It is not the
idea of a dead baby in a formaldehyde jar, a mutilated corpse, or a
suicide discovered in one's kitchen that is communicated; rather it is
the reality of those events and actions that is observed. If it is speech
at all, it is speech without a speaker. When one cannot plausibly argue
that either the free trade of ideas or the self-fulfillment of a speaker
is implicated, no first amendment concerns exist.
C.

Emotional Distress for the Content of Speech

The psuedo-speech cases, however, do not cover the entire spectrum
of situations in which emotional distress is inflicted through apparently
communicative conduct. Tort law has become increasingly hospitable
to causes of action in which "real speech" is the primary vehicle
through which the defendant induces distress-cases in which a speaker
and a message clearly exist, and the distress is caused by the content
of the message. Although this species of recovery has gained accelerated
momentum in recent years, it has an old and venerable pedigree. In
Wilkinson v. Downton, 205 the losing defendant was a practical joker
who told a woman that her husband had been severely injured in an
accident. The defendant could not interpose the comeback "can't you
take a joke?" as a defense in Wilkinson; the court ruled that statements
about the death or personal injury of loved ones were simply not joking
matters in civilized life. Later, in fact, an entire class of cases developed
in which courts imposed liability for erroneous messages announcing a
relative's death. 206
An intriguing modern manifestation of this issue is posed by Molien
v. Kaiser Foundation Hospita/,2°7 in which a doctor erroneously told a
patient that she had a venereal disease, and the patient repeated the
information to her husband. The marital friction caused by the false
diagnosis led to a divorce. The California Supreme Court permitted
the husband to recover for the emotional distress caused by the false
medical information given to his ex-wife. 208
Recovery for emotional distress is indeed routinely predicated upon
expressive activity in which the distress is undeniably linked to the
content of the message. Debt-collection cases, for example, are among

205. 2 Q.B. 57 (1897).
206. See, e.g., Kaufman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 224 F.2d 723 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 947 (1955); Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1975).
207. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
208. !d. at 931, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
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the most common fact patterns for emotional distress recovery. 209 Courts
have held defendants liable for the distress created in attempting to
recover debts even when the speech of the debt-collector is directed
only to the debtor, and not communicated to third persons. 210 The
emotional distress tort is also a recurring vehicle for recovery when
persons are falsely accused of shoplifting, 211 or of stealing from the
employer's cash-drawer. 212 Courts have also ruled that repeated sexual
advances are sufficient grounds for recovery based on infliction of
emotional distress. 2 13
In other contexts, courts permit recovery for the outrage of what is
said under the rubric of some recognized tort other than infliction of
emotional distress, even though the only compensable injury is emotional disturbance. In Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc. ,214 for
example, the plaintiff was a black customer attending a luncheon at a
restaurant club. As he picked up his plate to go through the line, an
employee of the cafeteria grabbed the plate from him and said that
blacks could not be served in the club. 215 A recovery of compensatory
and punitive damages for battery was upheld. Although the case has
been used as an example of the sort of common law rule we ritually
require first year law students to memorize-that a battery may be
consummated by an offensive touching of not only the person of the
plaintiff, but of an "appurtenance," such as an umbrella or plate216the case is really a powerful example of recovery for emotional distress
for the offensiveness of that which was communicated. The case had
no relationship to the law of battery other than its demonstration of
the quicksilver ingenuity with which a clever plaintiff's lawyer may
press an old tort to do new tricks. The damages awarded under the
Texas tort system expressed the community's outrage at the offensiveness of the race-hate and insult to human dignity embodied in a vicious
slur such as "we don't serve niggers here." There is, indeed, a certain
stirring sense of judicial triumph and pride in reading the case-here
is a Texas jury and Texas appellate court courageously renouncing

209. See, e.g., Delta Finance Co. v. Ganakas, 93 Ga. App. 297, 91 S.E.2d 383 (1956).
210. See, e.g., Bundren v. Superior Court of California, 145 Cal. App. 3d 784, 193 Cal. Rptr.
671 (1983).
211. See, e.g., Hall v. May Dept. Stores Co., 292 Or. 131, 637 P.2d 126 (1981).
212. See, e.g., M.B.M. Corp., Inc. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681 (1980).
213. See, e.g., Samms v. Eccles, II Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961).
214. 424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1967).
215. /d. at 628-29.
216. See W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 30-32 (6th
ed. 1976).

20:423]

HUSTLER v. FALWELL

465

racism through the common sensibilities of tort law in the South in
1967.
Courts have permitted a parallel form of recovery in battery or
assault cases involving sexual harrassment, in which the physical touching is fleeting or non-existent, and but for its verbal accompaniment,
innocuous. In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Hi/1, 211 for example,
the defendant's employee leaned across the counter to touch a woman's
hand, although he never made contact. He said to her, "If you will
come back here and let me love you and pet you, I will fix your
clock." 218 Although the court analyzed the matter in terms of whether
the counter was sufficiently narrow to allow the man's arm to reach
the plaintiff, it was not the attempted touching but the sexual advance
that really formed the heart of the case, and it was what the defendant
said that "consummated" the sexual advance.
After Hustler, do the rulings in these cases violate the first amendment? How will a court distinguish the insult to human dignity wrapped
up in the epithet "nigger" or in the uninvited sexual come-on from
the insult of being portrayed as one who has sex with one's mother?
To strike the iron where it is even hotter in first amendment terms,
consider that the Supreme Court has upheld recovery under the law of
defamation when the only injury for which the plaintiff seeks compensation is the emotional distress induced by the defamatory statement.
In Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 219 Mary Alice Firestone, ex-wife of Russell
Firestone, a scion of the wealthy Firestone family, sued for defamation
arising from a brief "milestones" blurb in Time magazine announcing
her divorce judgment. Time had summarized the grounds for the divorce
in terms that made Firestone appear to have a wide-open, robust, and
uninhibited sex life with men other than her husband. Although her
suit was for defamation, she dropped all claims for reputational injury
and predicated her entire recovery on the emotional anguish caused by
Time's characterization. 220 The Supreme Court upheld Firestone's jury
verdict of $100,000, holding that the first amendment's requirement of
"actual injury" for private defamation cases could be satisfied by
proving subjective emotional harm-no external injury to reputation

217. 25 Ala. App. 540, 150 So. 709 (1933).
218. /d. at 542, 150 So. at 710.
219. 424 u.s. 448 (1976).
220. Florida was among those states that had decided, as a matter of state law, that proof of
reputational damage is not prerequisite to recovery for defamation-internal emotional distress
will suffice standing alone, even when not "parasitic" to damage to reputation. See R. SMOLLA,
supra note 29, at § 9.06[5].
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was constitutionally mandated. 221 If the first amendment permits recovery for emotional distress in a defamation case in which no reputational
damage is claimed, why should it not also permit recovery when the
pretense of the defamation action is dropped, and a spade is called a
spade? Would Mary Alice Firestone have lost in the Supreme Court
(assuming she could surmount any obstacles posed by Florida law), if
she had chosen to style her claim one for infliction of emotional
distress?

D.

A Multi- Tiered Solution

These questions concerning the implications of the Supreme Court's
decision in Hustler must be addressed in light of the two most important
"clues" dropped in Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion. The first clue is
the explicit limitation of the holding to public officials and public
figures. 222 The second clue is the insistence in the opinion that "'not
all speech is of equal [f]irst [a]mendment importance." ' 223 Against the
backdrop of these two themes in the opinion, a multi-tiered solution
to the questions left unanswered by the Hustler decision may be
constructed.
1.

The Scale

The universe of tort recovery for emotional distress may be schematically arranged according to five variables: (1) whether the underlying tortious conduct is expressive or non-expressive; (2) whether, if
the conduct is expressive, the plaintiff is a public figure or public
official, or a private figure; (3) whether, if the conduct is expressive,
the communication involves matters of public interest; (4) whether the ·
victim's emotional distress is coupled with injury other than emotional
distress; and (5) whether the actor's conduct may be fairly characterized
as satisfying all of the elements of some tort other than emotional
distress, or instead must be challenged exclusively under the rubric of
emotional distress.
All non-expressive tortious conduct is outside of first amendment
concern. Whether to permit recovery for expressive conduct causing
emotional distress, however, involves an intricate balance of the remaining variables. A proper accommodation of first amendment values

221.
222.
223.
(1985)).

424 U.S. at 460.
_ _ U.S. a t - - · 108 S. Ct. at 882.
/d. (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758
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and the plaintiff's interests in emotional distress cases would apply the
five variables listed above according to the following rules:
(1) When the conduct is non-expressive, the plaintiff may recover if
the state law elements of the tort are satisfied, because no first amendment interests are at stake.
(2) When the conduct is expressive, the plaintiff is absolutely barred
from recovery when: (a) the plaintiff is a public official or public
figure; (b) the speech involves a matter of public concern; (c) no injury
other than emotional distress exists; and (d) no tort other than infliction
of emotional distress has been committed. (Reverend Falwell's case falls
into this category and thus, as the Supreme Court held, is absolutely
barred.)224
(3) When the conduct is expressive, and there is either injury suffered
other than emotional distress, or a tort committed other than intentional
infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff may recover subject to
these restrictions:
(a) When the plaintiff is a public figure or official, and the speech
concerns matters of public interest, one may recover for emotional
distress only when: (i) the challenged conduct is reckless or intentional
with regard to the risk of the non-emotional distress component of the
injury; or (ii) when the defendant commits a tort other than intentional
infliction of emotional distress and the conduct is intentional or reckless
with regard to the legal interest protected by that tort. In addition to
these requirements, all other currently existing first amendment restraints upon recovery for that tort, including absolute protection for
opinion, must be satisfied.
(b) When the plaintiff is a public figure or official, but the speech
does not involve matters of public concern, the same rules apply as in
(a) above, but the minimum constitutional fault threshhold is dropped
to negligence.
(c) When the plaintiff is a private figure, but the speech involves
issues of public concern, the same rules apply as in (a) above, but the
minimum constitutional fault threshhold is dropped to negligence.
(d) When the plaintiff is a private figure and the speech does not
involve any issue of public concern, the case is treated for first amendment purposes as if it were non-expressive conduct, and no first
amendment restrictions will apply, relegating the defendant's protection
solely to that available under applicable common law rules.

224. It is not the literal speech in the ad parody-sex in an outhouse with one's mother-that
qualifies as speech on issues of public concern, but rather the underlying opinion that Falwell is
a hyprocrite.
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The Logic of the Scale

This matrix of rules tracks, in its analytic structure, the multi-tiered
constitutional fault structure in defamation created by combining New
York Times Co. v. Sul/ivan, 225 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. ,226 and Dun
& Bradstreet, Inc. v. Green moss Builders, Inc. 227 It does not, however,
simply restate the current rules for defamation, 228 substituting for "defamation" the term "emotional distress"; such an approach would fall
into the trap set by the Fourth Circuit's enticing but flawed analysis. 229
Instead, the appropriate analysis readjusts the first amendment matrix
governing defamation to reflect the different balance of social interests
posed by emotional distress cases. That balance requires absolute immunity at the "high end" of the scale, when public plaintiffs sue to
recover for injuries caused by expressive conduct involving issues of
public concern, and the only actual injury or legal interest implicated
is emotional distress. When public plaintiffs sue to recover for injuries
caused by public speech, the capacity of the speech to cause emotional
disturbance is simply never enough, standing alone, to justify its
abridgement. 230
No absolute immunity is mandated, however, when the case implicates
some interest of the plaintiff other than the disturbing quality of the
speech; in such cases, the regulation of speech is incidental to the
protection of some palpable social interest distinct from the capacity
of the speech to disturb. The test for whether speech is being restricted
because of a state interest other than the disturbance quality of the
speech is whether one can identify, either factually or legally, some
non-emotional injury to the plaintiff. Thus, the fact that the plaintiff
can prove non-emotional injury, or that the plaintiff can point to some
independently cognizable non-emotional distress tort, such as assault,
battery, defamation, or invasion of privacy, is evidence that such a
palpable state interest exists. 231 Even in such cases, however, the sacrifice
of first amendment freedom must be meticulously balanced against the
strength of the state interest, according to the sliding scale in the rules
above. When the plaintiff and the speech are both public, the first

225. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
226. 418 u.s. 323 (1974).
227. 472 u.s. 749 (1985).
228. These rules are summarized in note 14, supra.
229. See infra text accompanying notes 28-39.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 82-97.
231. It is only on this basis that the Firestone decision is justified: the defendant was at fault
in relation to the risk of a false defamatory fact, implicating an interest other than emotional
distress alone.
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amendment interest is at its highest level. Abridgement of that interest
through tort liability is thus permitted only when there is intentional
or reckless conduct with regard to a risk other than the distress-inducing
potential of the speech. It is critical that the intentional or reckless
conduct be in relation to the other palpable interest being protected,
and not simply to the risk of causing distress; if the risk is only related
to distress, the case must fall within category (2) above, in which the
expressive conduct is absolutely protected.
This rationale remains applicable as one moves down the scale to
speech that involves public figures but no public issues, or public issues
but no public figures. Because first amendment concerns for penalizing
speech for its disturbance potential alone still exist in these cases, it
remains essential that the fault standard applied be in relation to risks
other than the emotional distress evoked by the speech. On the other
hand, because Gertz informs us that private figures are in greater need
and more deserving of tort remedies for injurious speech than public
figures, 232 and because speech concerning private matters and public
figures is of less first amendment significance than speech linked to a
plaintiff's public figure status, 233 the balance in these suits swings
towards negligence rather than reckless or intentional conduct. The
defendant must thus show both the public status of the plaintiff and
the public status of the speech to receive the benefit of the "knowing
or reckless" test. Showing only one of the two drops the minimum
first amendment standard to negligence. In all of these cases, however,
the first amendment requires that the risk be in relation to something
other than the emotional content of the speech.
3.

Applying the Scale

One should have no illusions, of course, that the process of separating
these interests will always be easy. That does not mean, however, that
such separation is impossible.
One of the most difficult cases that illustrates the problem of separating the emotive quality of speech from the invasion of other, more
palpable interests is Vietnamese Fisherman ·s Association v. Knights of
Ku Klux Klan. 234 In that case, hooded and robed Ku Klux Klansmen
rode past boats containing Vietnamese fisherman. The Klansmen carried
guns, and were in a boat that contained a cannon and a figure hung

232.
233.
234.

See supra text accompanying notes 178-90.
See supra note 14.

518 F. Supp. 993 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
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in effigy. The Klansmen fired a cannon towards the Vietnamese fishermen's boat.
The court held that in such circumstances Texas law might support
an action against the Klan members for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 235 Apparently, no first amendment defense was raised.
But if a first amendment defense had been vigorously pressed, what
would the correct result have been? Under the analysis here, the case
turns on the guns and the firing of the cannon. As the district court
recognized, brandishing the weaponry may have been sufficiently threatening to constitute assault. 236 Although the outrage one feels at the
actions of the Klan is fed primarily by the repugnance of the race-hate
displayed against the Vietnamese fisherman, in a free society the abominable speech of racists must be tolerated unless it threatens to ripen
into more palpable harm. Had the Klansmen merely boated past the
Vietnamese fisherman with sheets and shotguns and figures hung in
effigy, shouting "gooks go home" the first amendment should bar
recovery. In such circumstances, the repugnance of the conduct would
be in the message conveyed, a message driven home by the combination
of the racial slur, and the symbols of the sheets, guns and hanging
effigy. But the harm would still be only in the disturbing quality of
this message.
Once this speech escalates to threats of violence, however, an interest
other than the emotional disturbance caused by the content of the
speech is implicated. The brandishing of firearms and shooting of the
cannon combine to satisfy the common law definition of assault, by
creating a reasonable apprehension of bodily harm. No reasonable
person in the position of the Vietnamese fishermen could fail to be
fearful of an hysterical physical attack in such circumstances. The
Klansmen were at least negligent with regard to the threat of physical
harm-indeed, they were almost certainly intentionally seeking to intimidate through physical threats; therefore, imposing liability for infliction
of emotional distress does not offend the first amendment.
Similarly, in Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football C/ub, 231 the Philadelphia Eagles' staff physician erroneously informed a newspaper that
Chuy, one of the Eagles' players, had a fatal illness. Arguably, only

235. !d. at 1013.
236. !d. at 1012. The court was not satisfied that the plaintiffs had developed sufficient facts
to support liability for infliction of emotional distress or assault, but did find a likelihood of
success on the merits of several statutory civil rights claims and on the common law tort of
interference with contractual relationships. !d. at 1016.
237. 595 F .2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979) (en bane).
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the emotional impact of the speech predicated liability. On closer
examination, however, Chuy is more subtle, and actually involves the
intentional invasion of a more concrete interest of the plaintiff. Chuy
involved an intentional lie-the doctor deliberately spread a false statement of fact about Chuy's physical condition. The only reason the
statement was not libelous was that under Pennsylvania law the imputation of serious disease is deemed defamatory only if it is a stigmatizing illness, such as venereal disease. 238 But as Firestone instructs,
spreading a false statement of fact is a palpable harm which a state
may use as the basis for tort liability even when no reputational damage
ensues. The false statement in Chuy was verbal assault in a literal sense.
The power of the statement was indistinguishable from the power of a
bullet zipping past one's ear-Chuy thought he was going to die. The
fact that the speech failed to meet all the technical requirements for
defamation did not alter the fact that the harmful quality of the speech
was not solely its emotional offensiveness, but its factual error-a
factual error deliberately made by a doctor in a doctor/patient relationship and calculated to mislead the patient about his own health.
4.

The Lax Standard for Private Figure/Private Speech Cases

When the plaintiff is a private figure, and the speech at issue does
not address any issue of public concern, first amendment restrictions
on emotional distress recovery will be completely eliminated under this
proposed scale. Under the logic of Dun & Bradstreet, 239 the first
amendment value of this species of speech is so low that the unvarnished
rules of the common law are sufficient to protect it, and no independent
first amendment rules will apply. 240 The oppressive bill-collector's speech,
for example, involves a private figure plaintiff, and speech that falls
squarely within the type of commercial speech stripped of special first
amendment protection in Dun & Bradstreet. Just as common law
defamation rules operated without first amendment interference in the
commercial defamation context, they should operate untrammeled in
the context of commercial emotional distress. An act of sexual
harrassment in the workplace presents exactly the same first amendment

238. /d. at 1281.
239. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
240. For a discussion of the implications of Dun & Bradstreet, see R. SMOLLA, supra note 29,
at §§ 3.02-.05. Perhaps it is reading too much into nuance, but in defense of the scale proposed
here it may be worth noting that in making his point that all speech is not created equal, the
Chief Justice quoted from Dun & Bradstreet. See Hustler, _U.S. at _ _ , 108 S. Ct. at 882.
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balance; the plaintiff is a private figure and the speech concerns private
matters.
In both examples, our confidence that no special first amendment
rules should be imposed comes largely from the intuition that the speech
is inextricably wrapped up in the invasion of interests of the plaintiff
other than the content of the speech itself. The speech is part of some
other nonspeech business, such as a proposal to engage in a commercial
or a sexual transaction. The decision to treat the conduct as tortious
is really aimed at the transaction itself.
This analysis will accommodate equitably the vast run of cases. Like
any scheme of legal rules, however, it will inevitably have some rough
edges. One might ask, for example, whether cases falling into the
private figure/private speech category are genuinely different in kind
from cases in which the plaintiff is public but the speech is private.
Does it make sense to treat a public figure victimized by an oppressive
bill-collector, or by verbal sexual aggression, differently from a private
figure so victimized? Even if the first amendment interferes with Jerry
Falwell's right to recover from Larry Flynt for emotional distress,
should it also interfere with his right to sue the abusive collection
agency, or a superior at work who attempted to condition continuing
employment on Falwell submitting to sodomy? One might pose the
same problem in reverse: if the decision is made that fault in relation
to a risk other than distress is required when the speech or the plaintiff
is public, why shouldn't fault in relation to some non-emotional distress
interest also be required in the private figure/private speech situation?
After all, the rationale for excusing this latter category from first
amendment protection is that cases in this category usually involve
some palpable non-speech interest. Some private figure/private speech
verbal inflictions of emotional distress will not involve any other nonspeech "transactions." Suppose a capricious, malicious defendant walks
up to a stranger on the street and screams "You are an ugly motherrucker, I hope you die today!'' Does the first amendment permit
whatever recovery the common law provides, even though this speech
does not fit comfortably into the supposition that some other "transaction" is involved? In short, why not treat all of these cases alike,
and either require first amendment protection for all of them or none
of them?
And if one must choose between all or none, surely the choice must
be all. When the private figure, viciously assaulted with a torrent of
gratuitous vulgarity on the street, sues for emotional distress, should
not the first amendment impose the same sort of restrictions that have
evolved in the criminal context in the "fighting words" cases-a show-
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ing of risk of imminent harm other than the smarting of the words
themselves? 241 Why shouldn't the plaintiff bear the burden in every case
to demonstrate the defendant's fault in relation to some risk other than
the capacity of the speech to cause emotional disturbance?
The answer to these objections involves three observations. First, the
descending scale proposed here is, like the analogous scale in the first
amendment rules for defamation, based on the large run of cases, and
the paradigms one expects to find in each category. The notion in Gertz
that public figures assume greater risks and have greater access to
channels of counter-speech will not be true in all cases; the soundness
of the rule turns on how well the probabilities for most cases have
been assessed. Second, downside risks to a uniform rule exist regardless
of the direction in which the rule is bent. A single standard applied
across the board will either provide too much or too little first amendment protection. A graduated scale helps prevent fewer improperly
balanced cases from escaping. Third, there is a federalism benefit to
keeping the intrusion of constitutional rules upon the law of torts
confined to bright-line factors. If a first amendment calculus were made
an explicit requirement in every emotional distress case, the state law
of emotional distress would indeed be swallowed up by the federal
Constitution.
Tort law must be trusted to do some of its own work. Whatever
fears we may have that occasionally in a private figure/private speech
case there will be no social interest at stake other than the capacity of
the speech to disturb should be alleviated by trust in the internal
gyroscope of the law of torts. Tort law will, in its own wisdom, tend
to screen out most emotional distress claims in which no interest or
harm other than the emotive quality of the speech is implicated. It has
long been hard legal doctrine that mere verbal abuse, standing alone,
is not actionable. 242 Under standard defamation, privacy, and emotional
distress rules, plaintiffs are told that the door of tort recovery is not
open for the routine slings and arrows of outrageous fortune.
If tort law may be trusted in cases involving private figures and
private speech, the flip side is that we cannot trust it to be sufficiently
sensitive to first amendment values in public figure or public speech
cases. Preoccupation with common law elements of infliction of emotional distress will distract attention from the possibility that a plaintiff
is seeking recovery only because of the emotional content of the speech

241. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1970); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 573 (1942). See supra text accompanying notes 117-120.
242. See supra note 184.
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at issue. Because the probabilities of improperly penalizing protected
speech in public figure or public speech cases run higher than in private
figure/private speech cases, the first amendment now requires that the
plaintiff actually perform the task of separating the interests involved.
Unless the plaintiff can articulate some interest other than emotional
disturbance, and demonstrate at least negligence in relation to that
interest, the first amendment should bar recovery. When both public
figures and public speech are involved, the fear that tort liability is
being imposed solely because of the disturbing quality of the speech is
now at its highest, and the probability that that speech is within the
core of the first amendment is at its highest as well. The threat of selfcensorship is now so intense that only intentional or reckless misconduct
in relation to some risk independent of emotional distress will justify
liability. In these cases, the plaintiff is being forced to demonstrate the
separation of emotional distress interests from more palpable interests
that we were willing to simply assume existed in the private figure/
private speech cases. When the only harm caused by such public speech
about public figures is emotional distress, however, the first amendment
compels absolute protection.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's opinion in Hustler was a triumphant celebration
of freedom of speech. The most powerful challenges to the free speech
tradition have always come not from bad people but from good
people-people who would sanitize public discourse in order to elevate
it, people who would have our speech be less violent, less caustic, less
racist, less sexist, less sexual. But that, as Holmes instructed is not the
theory of the Constitution. Principle distinctions may be made when
speech is used to inflict palpable social harm. But in Hustler, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that no such distinctions are
possible when the only quarrel with the speech is its emotionally
disturbing quality. For that is what uninhibited robust and wide-open
speech is all about.

